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THE PROMISE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
RONALD J. MANN* & SETH R. BELZLEY**
ABSTRACT
The Internet has transformed the economics of communication,
creating a spirited debate about the proper role of federal, state, and
international governments in regulating conduct related to the
Internet. Many argue that Internet communications should be
entirely self-regulated because such communications cannot or
should not be the subject of government regulation. The advocates of
that approach would prefer a no-regulation zone around Internet
communications, based largely on the unexamined view that Internet
activity is fundamentally different in a way that justifies broad
regulatory exemption. At the same time, some kinds of activity that
the Internet facilitates undisputedly violate widely shared norms and
legal rules. State legislatures motivated by that concern have begun
to respond with Internet-specific laws directed at particular contexts,
giving little or no credence to the claims that the Internet needs
special treatment.
This Article starts from the realist assumption that government
regulation of the Internet is inevitable. Thus, instead of focusing on
the naive question of whether the Internet should be regulated, this
Article discusses how to regulate Internet-related activity in a way
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that is consistent with approaches to analogous offline conduct. The
Article also assumes that the Internet's most salient characteristic is
that it inserts intermediaries into relationships that could be, and
previously would have been, conducted directly in an offline
environment. Existing liability schemes generally join traditional
fault-based liability rules with broad Internet-specific liability
exemptions. Those exemptions are supported by the premise that in
many cases the conduct of the intermediaries is so wholly passive as
to make liability inappropriate. Over time, this has produced a great
volume of litigation, mostly in the context of the piracy of copyrighted
works, in which the responsibility of the intermediary generally turns
on fault, as measured by the intermediary's level of involvement in
the challenged conduct.
This Article argues that the pervasive role of intermediaries calls
not for a broad scheme of exoneration, premised on passivity, but
rather for a more thoughtful development of principles for
determining when and how it makes economic sense to allocate
responsibility for wrongful conduct to the least cost avoider. The
Internet's rise has brought about three changes that make
intermediaries more likely to be least cost avoiders in the Internet
context than they previously have been in offline contexts: (1) an
increase in the likelihood that it will be easy to identify specific
intermediaries for large classes of transactions, (2) a reduction in
information costs, which makes it easier for the intermediaries to
monitor the conduct of end users, and (3) increased anonymity,
which makes remedies against end users generally less effective.
Accordingly, in cases where intermediaries can feasibly control the
conduct, this Article recommends serious attention to the possibility
of one of three different schemes of intermediary liability: traditional
liability for damages, takedown schemes in which the intermediary
must remove offensive content upon proper notice, and 'hot list"
schemes in which the intermediary must avoid facilitation of
transactions with certain parties.
Part III of this Article uses that framework to analyze the propriety
of intermediary liability for several kinds of Internet-related
misconduct. This Article is agnostic about the propriety of any
particular regulatory scheme, recognizing the technological and
contextual contingency of any specific proposal. Because any such
240 [Vol. 47:239
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scheme will impose costs on innocent end users, selecting a particular
level of regulation should depend on policymakers' view of the net
social benefits of eradicating the misconduct, taking into account the
intermediaries'and innocent users'compliance costs associated with
the regulation. Still, the analysis of this Article suggests three points.
First, the practicality of peer-to-peer distribution networks for the
activity in question is an important consideration because those
networks undermine the regulatory scheme's effectiveness, thereby
making regulation less useful. Second, the highly concentrated
market structure of Internet payment intermediaries makes reliance
on payment intermediaries particularly effective as a regulatory
strategy because of the difficulty illicit actors have in relocating to
new payment vehicles. Third, with respect to security harms, such as
viruses, spam, phishing, and hacking, this Article concludes that the
addition of intermediary liability in those cases is less likely to be
beneficial because market incentives appear to be causing
intermediaries to undertake substantial efforts to solve these
problems without the threat of liability.
2005]
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INTERNET INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
To think about the role of law in electronic commerce is to
consider the balance between government regulation and freedom
of action in the private sector. Juxtaposing that balance with the
Internet's commercialization in 1994 and its rapid growth since then
presents an unusually dynamic policy problem. In her book Ruling
the Waves, Debora Spar portrays the problem aptly, arguing that
society's reactions to important discoveries follow a cyclical histori-
cal pattern.' Using examples that start with the fifteenth century
reign of Prince Henry, "the Navigator of Portugal," and continue
through the rise of the Internet in the twentieth century, she
discerns four phases through which the society that exploits those
discoveries commonly passes: innovation, commercialization,
creative anarchy, and rules.2 The phase of innovation is the flash
point of discovery. Morse's invention of the telegraph provides an
example.3 The phase of commercialization is the phase in which
pioneers, or pirates, depending on your perspective, move into the
new area seeking to exploit its potential. For example, Spar
discusses the pirates who exploited the newly discovered Atlantic
trade routes in the seventeenth century.4 The phase of creative
anarchy is the phase when the needs of ordinary commerce come
into tension with the theretofore freewheeling spirit of the new
frontier.5 Spar's best example of that phase is from the early years
of radio broadcasting, when competing and wholly unregulated
radio stations broadcasted on overlapping frequencies, thereby
making any station difficult for listeners to hear.6 The final phase,
the rules phase, follows ineluctably as the commercial enterprises
unable to suppress anarchy on their own call upon government
1. DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND WEALTH
FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 10-11 (2001).
2. Id. at 11 ("[L]ife along the technological frontier moves through four distinct phases:
innovation, commercialization, creative anarchy, and rules.").
3. Id. at 11-12.
4. Id. at 12-15.
5. Id. at 15-18.
6. Id. at 157-59.
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intervention as the best vehicle to bring order and profit to the wild
frontier.7
Using that framework, the Internet is in the midst of the third
phase. Numerous examples exist of early actors whose businesses
have provided a major impetus for the Internet's growth. A set of
legal rules also exists that have granted those actors broad freedom
of action or exempted them from rules that govern analogous
conduct outside cyberspace. Consider, for example, the immunity
the Communications Decency Act (CDA)8 and the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA)9 granted Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), the protection from new taxation the Internet Tax Freedom
Act granted,10 the rise of unregulated peer-to-peer music sharing,
and the lack of regulation of person-to-person payment providers.
Each of those instances, however, has been associated with a
growing backlash of pressure, as parties, who perceive that those
exemptions disadvantage them, seek the establishment of more
rigorous regulatory regimes. That backlash is a primary indication
that an industry has developed to the point where regulation is
appropriate. This Article considers how to implement regulatory
regimes that are better suited for the Internet context.11 The basic
problem is that although the Internet undeniably has brought
increased efficiency to American firms, eased communication among
distant friends, and changed how we shop, book travel arrange-
7. Id. at 18-22.
8. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (2004) (making certain requirements of the CDA inapplicable
to ISPs).
9. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (2004) (exempting ISPs from liability for monetary relief for the
transmission of materials that infringe copyrights).
10. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. 11, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998). This
moratorium on taxing Internet access has been extended twice since its original enactment,
most recently in December 2004 as the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
435, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004). State and local taxation of Internet access services will thus be
prevented through at least October 2007. See Bush Signs IDEA, Internet Tax Bills, CONGRESS
DAILY, Dec. 3, 2004, at 8. For general discussion of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, see Arthur
J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet Is Changing Tax
Laws, 34 CONN. L. REv. 333, 363-65 (2002); U.S. House Clears Tax Ban on Internet Service,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at AS.
11. Of course, the first question in each instance is why the harmed businesses cannot
solve the problems on their own. For example, no matter how annoying it might be, why
should the government regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail given the obvious market
pressures spurring the major ISPs to disable those who send it? That question motivates the
skepticism this Article expresses about such regulation in Part III.B.
244 [Vol. 47:239
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ments, and provide and enjoy entertainment, it also affords the
same ease of communication, increased efficiency, and, importantly,
anonymity for those who prefer to use those advantages to violate
the law. Legal reactions to one pervasive violation, the Internet-
based piracy of copyrighted works, have been especially vigorous,
perhaps because that activity poses a serious threat to an en-
trenched industry scared of losing its grasp over its only as-
set--copyrighted works. Countless numbers of reporter and law
review pages have been devoted to finding ways to prevent Internet
piracy. Nevertheless, Internet piracy continues and promises to
recover from its recent dip,12 as software developers and users adapt
and evolve to avoid the legal regime's current attempts to control
their activities.
Piracy is not this Article's focus, in part because the eradication
of piracy would require an exercise more in the vein of social
engineering than in legal reform.13 Rather, this Article's focus is on
a number of the Internet's other common uses for unlawful purposes
that have attracted much less attention. For example, each day
gamblers physically present in jurisdictions that outlaw gambling
12. In fact, some industry experts suggest that the efficacy of Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) lawsuits is short-lived. See Carolyn Said, Studios to Sue
Pirates; Film Industry Fights Illegal File Sharing, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2004, at C1 ('"When
the RIAA has filed a bunch of lawsuits, we've seen a decrease in file sharing for a month to
a month and a half; then it comes back up again,' said Jim Graham, a spokesman for BayTSP
of Los Gatos, which tracks files offered online for sharing."). But evidence also exists that
lawsuits are effecting long-term successes in some cases. See File-Sharing Website Ceases
Operations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C3 (reporting that entire websites that hosted links
to a popular file-sharing program called Bit Torrent were completely shutting down after
lawsuits were filed against one hundred operators of such sites). It remains to be seen,
however, if the Bit Torrent system will recover from this setback. Indeed, less centralized
means of locating torrents (the files necessary for downloading content) have already
emerged. See SuperNova.org - Universal BitTorrent Source, http://www.supernova.org (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005) (offering a link to software called eXeem, which allows BitTorrent
users to find torrents over an independent network). This evolution is familiar. See infra notes
220-24 and accompanying text.
13. Many would argue that this is a case where the underlying business models must shift
to meet the regulatory regime's limitations. Indeed, there is reason to believe that there is a
substantial upside to the business models that the Internet facilitates. See JOHN ALDERMAN,
SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC 185-87 (2001) (listing some
of the new business possibilities that have been sparked by the growth of online music
sharing); Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004 (describing how the ability to
provide broader product offerings gives electronic commerce merchants the ability to extract
profits from books, music, and movies that could not profit in an offline retail environment),
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html.
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bet millions of dollars on card games and sports matches. Although
Internet use arguably does not affect the illegality of that
gambling, 4 little has been done to curtail the activity. Further, the
Internet has made the balance between regulating socially unac-
ceptable forms of speech and violating the First Amendment more
difficult, leading to the proliferation of material such as child
pornography. Similarly, the anonymity that the Internet fosters has
made it easier to buy and sell counterfeit goods, pharmaceuticals
that are not lawfully available in the jurisdiction of purchase, and
other forms of contraband. Moreover, Americans spend billions of
dollars and millions of hours each year combating computer viruses
spread over the Internet. 15
Although the Internet has improved our lives in dozens of ways,
it has also given rise to detrimental behavior that has proven hard
to constrain. Controlling that conduct without restraining the
Internet's potential is surely a worthy goal. This Article suggests
that the impulse to respond to those problems inevitably involves
ISPs and other Internet intermediaries, chiefly payment intermedi-
aries (PIs), such as PayPal, and auction intermediaries, such as
eBay. Although a traditional focus on the underlying wrongful
conduct would view the intermediary as a passive conduit exempt
from normative responsibility for the activity of parties who use its
system,16 direct regulation of the responsible parties is often
impractical. Where the principal difficulty for analogous offline
misconduct is the common lack of financial responsibility by the
offenders, the Internet's rise presents regulators with new chal-
lenges by making it easier for illicit actors to conceal their identities
and to locate themselves in jurisdictions beyond the reach or
influence of U.S. law enforcement officials.'
14. See infra notes 12-28.
15. One estimate put the total cost of viruses at $55 billion for 2003. Compressed Data,
TORONTO STAR, Jan. 17, 2004, at D4 ("Trend Micro Inc., the world's third-largest anti-virus
software maker, said yesterday computer virus attacks cost global businesses an estimated
$55 billion (U.S.) in damages in 2003, a sum that would rise this year.").
16. For an emphatic statement of that perspective, see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655,
658-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.).
17. For an interesting discussion of jurisdictional issues created by the multinational
character of the Internet, see Joel Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the attacks by Internet companies on jurisdiction
and arguing that technology will make personal jurisdicti6n more clear as computers become
246 [Vol. 47:239
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Meanwhile, Internet intermediaries often play critical roles in the
illicit behavior that frustrates regulators. Indeed, Internet interme-
diaries often profit directly from transactions that effectively would
be banned in an offline environment. Of course, policymakers have
not been blind to the possibility of employing Internet intermediar-
ies to control their customers' misconduct. As early as 1995, a task
force created by President Clinton suggested imposing strict liability
on ISPs as a means for controlling some of the Internet's dangers.'"
More recently, state attorneys general and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) reached an agreement
with major credit card companies to prevent the processing of
payments for illegal Internet cigarette sales.'" Similar initiatives
have been proposed in Congress to address the problem of online
sales of prescription drugs,2 ° and Pennsylvania passed a statute that
but for being held unconstitutional would have required ISPs to
block access to child pornography sites.2' Private parties have
pursued intermediaries under principles of tort law. For example,
in recent suits against Grokster 22 and eBay,2" plaintiffs have
more interdependent, and as technology more readily allows Internet companies to
purposefully avail themselves of a jurisdiction).
18. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 114-24
(1995) (discussing the arguments for and against carving out an exception to the general rule
of vicarious liability in copyright infringement for ISPs and rejecting such an approach),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
19. See New York Hits Online Sellers of Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at B1
(describing New York State's efforts to combat online cigarette sales); Press Release, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Attorneys General and ATF Announce Joint
Initiative with Credit Card Companies to Prevent Illegal Cigarette Sales Over the Internet
(Mar. 17, 2005), http://www.atf.gov/press/fy05press/031705Internetcigsalesinitiative.htm.
These agreements have proved to be extremely effective. Bob Tedeschi, Now that Credit Card
Companies Won't Handle Online Tobacco Sales, Many Merchants Are Calling It Quits, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, at C5.
20. See Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, Google to Limit Some Drug Ads, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at Al.
21. See infra notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
22. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (finding
third-party liability for copyright infringement against manufacturers who distribute a
product with the object of promoting infringing uses of the product):
23. Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that
eBay was protected under section 512(c)(3) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for
assisting in the sale of infringing material when notice of the infringement was not specific
enough).
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directed their attention to Internet intermediaries in trying to
curtail conduct that has detrimental effects on their businesses.
Thus far, however, the law has failed to respond in a way that
effectively regulates the activity of the intermediaries. On the
contrary, as discussed above, to the extent that Congress has
addressed the question, it has designed laws to insulate the
intermediaries from liability.2 4 State regulators have been consider-
ably more aggressive, but, as this Article discusses, much of the
existing formal legislative activity has either fallen in the face of
litigation25 or has encountered problems with coordinating efforts
among multiple jurisdictions.26 Hopefully, this Article's focus on the
costs and benefits of regulation can guide regulators in developing
nuanced and context-specific rules that are more likely to withstand
judicial attack. Recognizing the differing constituencies and aims of
state and federal regulators,27 this Article's analysis also should
facilitate the cooperation of federal authorities that will be neces-
sary to provide effective solutions to the problems motivating
existing state initiatives. At the same time, this Article will
illuminate the just concerns of technologists trying to preserve the
Internet's generative potential, with a view to facilitating interven-
tion that is more sensitive and less blunt.2" Thus, among other
24. Joel Reidenberg in particular has emphasized the incongruity of Congress's preference
for broad statutory exemptions coupled with the facility with which intermediaries could
address some of the most salient problems. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet
Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213, 223-25 (2003) (noting the early exemptions for
Internet intermediaries and the need to look for enforcement mechanisms directed at
intermediaries).
25. The most salient example is Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (invalidating a Pennsylvania statute that targeted
intermediaries in an effort to limit access to adult content). A fair assessment of that litigation
is that excessively aggressive and insensitive enforcement by state regulators led to the
demise of a regulatory initiative that might have survived had it been implemented with a
more guarded attitude.
26. Compare, for example, the relative success states have had in regulating cigarette
sales, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, with the persistent difficulty that
Massachusetts has encountered in enforcing its unusual though plainly legitimate weapons
law; see Press Release, Massachusetts Attorney General, AG Reilly Obtains Court Order
Prohibiting Online Sales by Weapons Dealers (Sept. 10, 2004) (discussing repeated lawsuits
directed at online weapons dealers), http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=986&id =1289.
27. For a parallel emphasis on the differing perspectives of state and federal regulators
attending to corporate governance, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2491 (2005).
28. For a general discussion of the risks of unduly intrusive intervention, see Jonathan
[Vol. 47:239
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things, this Article's analysis evinces a general preference for
initiatives that grant safe harbors to intermediaries in response to
specifically defined conduct rather than generally imposing
liability.29
Scholars have followed up on those possibilities in a variety of
ways. Doug Lichtman, for example, has argued in coauthored papers
with Bill Landes and Eric Posner that traditional principles of tort
law properly can be used to impose a greater level of responsibility
on intermediaries." Although sympathetic to much of Lichtman's
analysis, this Article takes a different tack because it largely
jettisons the traditional tort principles on which Lichtman builds.
In this Article's view, the normative underpinnings of traditional
tort law are not as useful a device for establishing appropriate
standards of conduct as the more direct and contextual focus on the
costs and benefits of intermediary liability that this Article pro-
poses. As this Article illustrates, a focus on traditional tort law
notions of fault necessarily diverts attention to subjective normative
questions of blame and responsibility, and away from the more
proper focus on questions of effective regulatory design.
Other scholars have considered the possibility that intermediaries
might be the least-cost avoiders of some forms of Internet-related
misconduct. Assaf Hamdani, for example, discusses a number of
Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-and How to Save It (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors). For a few current examples, see Katie Dean, Techies Blast Induce Act,
WIRED, July 23, 2004 (discussing the proposed Inducing Infringements of Copyright Act, S.
2560, 108th Cong. (2004), that would impose liability on manufacturers of devices that
"induce" users to engage in illegal filesharing), available at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,64315,00.html?tw--wn tophead_2; Michael Geist, Do We Want FCR-
Based, Surveillance-Ready Web? Say No to Big Brother Plan for Internet, TORONTO STAR, Mar.
7, 2005, at D1 (decrying Canada's proposed "lawful access" initiative, which would require all
ISPs to facilitate real-time interception of Internet communications).
29. The National Association of Attorneys General, for example, has called for granting
states a right of action in federal courts to obtain nationwide injunctive relief against
intermediaries to stop unlicensed online pharmacies. See Press Release, National Association
of Attorneys General, Kansas Attorney General Carla Stovall Testifies on Illegal Online
Pharmacies, State-Federal Cooperation to Protect Consumer (undated), http://www.naag.
org/legislationlstovallonline-pharm.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). More recent efforts
against intermediaries presage analogous legislative initiatives against the intermediaries.
See Gaul & Flaherty, supra note 20, at Al.
30. Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement:
An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 404-05 (2003); Doug Lichtman & Eric
Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable 3 (Univ. Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 217, 2004), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract =573502.
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problems with imposing strict liability on ISPs for cyberwrongs. 31
Similarly, Kumar Katyal's work on cybercrimes discusses the
possibility of imposing liability on ISPs as a response.32 Generally,
however, that literature has failed to understand how the tailoring
of remedies to particular contexts can alter or remove many of the
most salient and powerful problems with intermediary liability. For
example, Hamdani provides a detailed analysis of the considerations
that justify a choice between strict and negligence-based liability for
gatekeepers, but his framework suggests that no gatekeeper
liability should exist in cases in which a damages regime is too
costly.33 As explained in Part II.B, other operationally less intrusive
regulatory alternatives exist, such as takedown regimes and "hot
list" schemes, which in many contexts might vitiate the costs that
justifiably concern Hamdani. Similarly, Katyal's perceptive
discussion focuses on the idea that principles of "due care" should
guide regulation of intermediaries. 34 He does not recognize that
effective regulation of intermediaries must leave concepts of "due
care" behind.
In sum, this Article's basic thesis is that the time has come for the
Internet to grow up and for Congress and the businesses that rely
on the Internet to accept a mature scheme of regulation that limits
the social costs of illegal Internet conduct in the most cost-effective
manner.35 Part I of this Article sets the stage by describing the
Internet's technological structure, the actors who serve as interme-
diaries, and the existing liability regimes, which are largely fault-
based. Part II describes a new proposal, which rests entirely on the
economic principle of identifying the least-cost avoider. In a
consciously exceptionalist" argument, this Article argues that
31. Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916-21
(2002).
32. Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149'U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1095-101
(2001). For a similar discussion of Internet gambling, see Jonathan Gottfried, The Federal
Framework for Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 26, 11 74-81 (2004), http:/law.
richmond.edu/jolt/vlOi3/article26.pdf.
33. The closest Hamdani comes to considering alternative regimes is a brief passage
suggesting that legislators might impose specific monitoring standards instead of damages
liability. Hamdani, supra note 31, at 934-35.
34. Katyal, supra note 32, at 1095-101.
35. This is a sentiment that is quickly gaining favor among scholars. E.g., Michael Geist,
Revise Rules to Foster Competition, Protect Privacy, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 21, 2005, at C3.
36. Although this Article's argument tends to suggest special rules for the Internet, Part
250 [ ol. 47:239
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specific characteristics of the Internet make intermediary liability
relatively more attractive than it has been in traditional offline
contexts because of the ease of identifying intermediaries, the
relative ease of intermediary monitoring of end users, and the
relative difficulty of directly regulating the conduct of end users.
This Article then discusses the circumstances when intermediary
liability will be practical, and the characteristics that differentiate
the desirability of the three different regimes of liability: traditional
damages regimes, takedown regimes in which offensive content
must be removed after proper notice, and "hot list" regimes in which
the intermediary must avoid facilitating transactions with certain
parties. Finally, Part III applies the proposal to four types of content
harms-contraband, gambling, child pornography, and piracy-and
to the general category of security harms. Although previous writers
have discussed extensively the pros and cons of imposing liability on
intermediaries related to piracy, relatively little attention has been
focused on the role intermediaries can play in other contexts, and
almost no attention has been focused on the specific features of
intermediaries and their particular businesses, which make
regulation in particular contexts more and less effective.
I. THE INTERNET AND MISCONDUCT
A. The End-to-End Structure of the Internet
The Internet is essentially a series of computers connected
through a complex system of cables. Originally, the United States
Government conceived of and designed the Internet for use by the
military and university researchers." When use of the Internet was
II.A justifies those special rules by grounding them in specific features of the Internet. As the
discussion below should make clear, this Article is generally more sympathetic to the view
that traditional principles of regulatory analysis are adequate to respond to the Internet's
special features. For a forceful argument for applying traditional principles, see Jack
Goldsmith in works such as Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1233-37 (1998).
Indeed, a principal motivation for this Article is the view that the existing Internet-based
exceptions from liability go too far in protecting conduct that would be unlawful in more
conventional contexts.
37. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 36-39 (1999) (describing the
creation of packet switching and the interlinking of distant computers during the 1960s and
1970s by the Advanced Research Projects Administration, a division of the Department of
2005].
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confined exclusively to the military, military contractors, university
researchers, or the military itself managed connections between
computers. But as the Internet was adapted to public use, private
companies emerged to provide the links among private computers
connected to the Internet.8
Today, the Internet is a web of privately owned networks that
communicate using a common computer language called Transfer
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).9 When an Internet
user requests data over the Internet, the user's request is routed
first from the user's computer to the network to which the computer
is connected, then across lines to the network that the computer
holding the requested content is connected, and finally to the
computer that contains the requested content. These separate
networks that comprise the Internet could be operated using a
number of different transfer languages. The Internet's structure and
the common use of TCP/IP for transfer between networks allow
these different networks to communicate with each other. Larry
Lessig has described this structure as utilizing an end-to-end (E2E)
principle that places the intelligence of the network at the end of
unintelligent conduits, thus allowing the network to easily evolve
and adapt to changing and improving technology.4" Lessig suggests
that this design has strong implications for and even dictates the
appropriate types of Internet regulations.4 This Article agrees with
Lessig that regulations which compromise the end-to-end structure
of the Internet must be recognized as imposing a cost in the form of
restricting future innovations in Internet applications. Rather than
viewing the end-to-end principle as inviolate, however, this Article
Defense).
38. See id. at 195-200.
39. Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and
the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 821 (2004).
40. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OFTHE COMMONS INA CONNECTED
WORLD 34-35 (2001). Although Lessig did not originally conceive of the E2E principle, he has
locked onto the idea and eloquently suggested the logical implications of the Internet's
structure for Internet regulations.
41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 942-43 (2001)
(arguing that the E2E principle suggests that cable broadband ISPs should not be allowed to
force customers to subscribe to particular content in order to receive Internet service).
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believes that it is sufficient simply to recognize the costs of intrusive
regulations in a larger cost-benefit analysis.42
B. Internet Actors
Although previous scholars have built on Lessig's insight by
breaking the Internet down into various layers that might be
regulated in different ways,4" this Article takes the key point to be
a recognition that the bulk of the regulable activity is likely to occur
at the ends of transmissions, rather than in the middle. This does
not mean, however, that the parties to Internet transmissions
interact with a featureless black box that is beyond the reach of law
or regulatory initiative." Rather, the implication is that a sensible
regulatory framework must start with an understanding of the
different kinds of actors that are situated at the endpoints of
Internet transmissions and are acting to facilitate the actions of end
users sending, requesting, and receiving those transmissions. The
following Sections provide a crude taxonomy.
1. Primary Malfeasors
Primary malfeasors offer or receive content or products over the
Internet that violate laws relating to copyright, child pornography,
gambling, trademarks, and other subjects. A gambling website's
proprietor, for example, offers content over the Internet that allows
visitors to violate gambling laws. On the other side of the transac-
tion, visitors to a gambling website receive content and interact with
the content in ways that violate gambling laws. Likewise, a person
who introduces a malicious Internet worm onto a network operates
42. For a similar intuition, see Zittrain, supra note 28, at 107-08. Canadian regulators
have determined that violating the end-to-end principle is justified by the need for regulating
Internet conduct. Their "lawful access" initiative would require ISPs and future
communications providers to design their networks so that they can collect data about
customers and intercept transmissions when required by law. See Geist, supra note 28. For
general information on the Canadian initiative, see SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE LAWFUL
ACCESS CONSULTATION (Nevis Consulting Group ed., 2003), http://canada.justice.gc.calen/
cons/laalIsummary/]as_report_042803_e.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Solum & Chung, supra note 39; Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet
Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 59 (2002).
44. For example, consider the Canadian "lawful access" initiative. See supra note 42.
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at the content layer by putting content onto the web that threatens
computers with Internet access.
2. Internet Intermediaries
The Internet's early days witnessed many broad claims about how
the Internet would lead to widespread disintermediation,45 as
transacting parties gained the ability to deal directly with each
other. The reality, however, has been precisely the contrary. At a
basic level, the Internet's technology requires the insertion of
intermediaries between interacting parties in two ways. First, for all
interactions over the Internet, the communication necessarily
involves the Internet itself, as well as the parties necessary to
facilitate the particular communication, with the exception of those
relatively few entities sufficiently involved in Internet transmis-
sions to be directly connected to each other. More importantly for
this Article's purposes, commercial transactions on the Internet
require the use of other intermediaries. In commercial transactions,
payment intermediaries must be used, because such transactions
cannot use cash as payment. Auction intermediaries are also often
employed to bring the parties together. This Article cannot hope to
describe all the intermediaries that facilitate Internet commerce in
the current environment, much less those that will arise in the
future. For present purposes, however, a focus on three classes of
businesses will be useful. These classes include the most prevalent
and interesting types of intermediaries: ISPs, payment intermediar-
ies, and auction intermediaries.
45. See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic
Commerce, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 795, 795-97 (1998).
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a. ISPs
ISPs are necessary at every stage of an Internet transaction.46 To
end users, the ISP is the entity responsible for making access to the
content on the Internet possible. An end user is not concerned with
which company provides the physical network that transmits data
across the country or the protocols that ensure the data gets routed
to the correct place. But recognizing the importance of context
sensitivity to appropriate regulatory design, distinguishing different
roles that ISPs play in common Internet activities is important.
For this Article's purposes, it is useful to distinguish three
distinct roles that ISPs might play in an Internet transaction:
backbone providers, source ISPs, and destination ISPs. The first
group, backbone providers, includes those that operate solely at the
transmission level, with no direct relationship to any of the actors
at the transmission's endpoints.. Backbone providers are of rela-
tively little interest to this Article, because of the. costs and difficul-
ties involved in configuring their networks to distinguish among the
different types of data they carry.4 v
Destination ISPs serve. the end user who requests content over
the Internet. These ISPs are the entities that bill the end user for
Internet service and provide applications such as the ability to
46. As Jonathan Bick explains:
Even the simplest Internet transaction usually involves a user's computer, an
Internet service provider's access computer, a regional router, a governmental
backbone computer, another regional router, another Internet service provider's
computer, and a content provider's computer. So, even in the simplest
transactions, there are many more intermediaries than users or content
providers.
Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 63-64
(1998).
47. Earlier writers seem to have taken this view by arguing that the difficulty of
understanding the data that travels over ISP networks is an artifact of the Internet's basic
transmission protocol, under which such data takes the form of disintegrated packets of any
particular file. See LESSIG, supra note 40, at 34; Solum & Chung, supra note 39, at 829.
Commenters on this Article, however, suggest that this perspective is overstated. First, it
seems plain that backbone providers can readily discern the IP address to which packets are
being routed. More generally, readers of a draft of this Article easily imagined technology that
would allow backbone providers to recognize certain types of content passing through its
network. As with much of this Article's analysis, technological changes might change the
optimal regulatory strategy. Regulation at the backbone level, however, is likely in most cases
to involve costs to all traffic, which would outweigh the benefits reasonably attributable to the
regulation. See Zittrain, supra note 28.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
connect to the World Wide Web. Thus, they serve as the end users'
gateways to everything on the Internet. As the owners of the
equipment that operates to link networks to the Internet backbone
and that translates application data into a format that can be
transmitted along.the backbone, these ISPs are well placed to block
access to data available on the Internet or to prevent the transfer of
harmful data, such as worms, viruses, or spam.
One premise of this Article is that the current regime's inability
to control many of the Internet's harms comes from a myopic focus
on the source ISP, the ISP which provides access to the businesses
that make unlawful content available.4" For regulatory purposes,
two important distinctions exist between the destination ISP and
the source ISP. The first is a substantive one: the destination ISP
serving ordinary end users is most unlikely to have any direct
involvement with or specific knowledge regarding the primary
malfeasor. The source ISP, in contrast, may be involved in multiple
ways that are relevant both in assessing the "fairness" of "blaming"
the source ISP for the misconduct (the predominant question in
existing judicial doctrine) and in assessing how effectively the
source ISP can serve as a gatekeeper to stop the misconduct (the
predominant question for this Article). For example, a source ISP
that provides not only access but also a server on which the
unlawful material resides may be better placed to monitor and
control the activity than one providing only access.
The second distinction, however, is more important for this
Article: a destination ISP that wishes to serve ordinary end users
cannot readily remove itself from the jurisdiction of the government
in whose territory the users are located. By contrast, a source ISP
willing to facilitate unlawful behavior can remove itself to a
jurisdiction that does not prohibit the behavior in question. Thus,
for example, a source ISP willing to facilitate Internet casinos can
make its services available anywhere local laws allow such activi-
ties, 49 putting these entities outside the reach of most law enforce
48. Jonathan Zittrain best makes this point. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of
Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 661-62 (2003).
49. In such a structure, there is and has been an international race to the bottom to
attract business to certain countries by decreasing the legal obstacles to their establishment.
In the context of Internet gambling, the winner of this race has arguably been the small island
of Antigua in the British West Indies. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET
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ment agencies.50 But a destination ISP providing the connection for
customers in Ohio to visit an Internet casino in Antigua must be
present in Ohio, if only in the form of a local server, cable, or router.
b. Payment Intermediaries
Payment intermediaries facilitate the transfer of funds between
parties to Internet transactions. Because most Internet transactions
do not involve face-to-face interactions between the transacting
parties, some intermediary ordinarily must be enlisted to make it
practical for a buyer to transfer funds reliably to a seller. For
example, when an Internet user incurs a debt, either by shopping on
the Internet or visiting sites that charge fees for activities conducted
there, payment intermediaries are involved in the chain of events
required for the transaction to be consummated. Thus, if A visits a
gambling website whose servers are located in Antigua and signs up
for an account so he can participate in a game of Internet poker, A
must provide the website with some form of security to ensure
payment of any gambling debts. Often, a website will simply require
a credit card to be on file. Alternatively, the site may use A's bank
to transfer money in advance or otherwise to secure some assurance
that A's potential gambling losses will be covered. In practice, the
credit card company or the bank is a necessary actor for A's conduct.
This Article's regulatory analysis depends heavily on particular
features of existing Internet payment intermediaries. Most impor-
tantly, the market is highly concentrated in the hands of the
GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 52 (2002) (listing thirty-five of eighty-eight Internet
gambling websites as registered in either Antigua or Barbuda, but not reporting the percent
of Internet gambling taking place at these sites), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0389.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Don Yaeger, Bucking the Odds, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 8, 2001, at R1 ("Some 850 Web gambling sites are based ... [in Antigua]
and an estimated 80% of all gaming URLs on the Web can be traced back to servers on the
108-square-mile island.").
50. Indeed, the United States even brought a suit in the World Trade Organization
against the countries of Antigua and Barbuda in an effort to curtail the proliferation of
Internet gambling operations on those tiny island nations. The United States lost. See Herb ies
Helps Antigua in WTO Outsourcing Victory, LAWYER, Apr. 5, 2004, at 10. A more recent WTO
decision seems to have been broad enough to allow for at least some U.S. regulation of
Internet gambling, but that decision certainly stops short of endorsing such regulation. See
Fox Butterfield, U.S. Limits on Internet Gambling Are Backed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at
C14.
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dominant credit card networks, and new entrants face high, perhaps
insuperable, barriers to entry.51 At some point, intermediaries that
have such a comprehensive command of the market begin to
resemble the common carriers on whom lawmakers typically have
imposed regulatory obligations in the public interest. To be sure,
early predictions were that a new kind of money-generically called
electronic money-would be created to facilitate Internet transac-
tions. Still, those technologies have not yet gained any significant
base of users, and little reason exists to think they will gain such a
user base in the foreseeable future.52 The, most -common new
payment mechanism for Internet transactions are person-to-person
(P2P) systems,53 such as PayPal, which allow nonmerchant individu-
als to receive payments, but even that market has rapidly become
highly concentrated. 4 For Internet actors with a business model
that involves the receipt of money, the concentrated and barrier-
protected model provides a highly visible "choke point" for regula-
tory intervention: an Internet pharmacy in Canada cannot profit-
ably sell pharmaceuticals to U.S. citizens if it does not accept
payment devices that U.S. citizens are likely to use.55
c. Auction Intermediaries
The last major type of intermediary is the auction intermediary,
which matches buyers and sellers through a website that acts as a
mediating device to facilitate sales between remote parties.
Although other competitors exist, eBay is the dominant and typical
player in this multibillion-dollar industry, and thus not surprisingly
51. In 2002, more than eighty percent of Internet transactions used credit cards. Ronald
J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEx. L. REV. 681, 681 (2004).
52. See RONALD J. MANN & JANE K WINN, ELECrRONIC COMMERCE 576 (2d ed. 2005).
53. P2P in this context is to be distinguished from the more common use of the same
acronym to describe the peer-to-peer filesharing discussed in the context of piracy.
54. See Mann, supra note 51, at 683-84.
55. Recognizing that situation, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) at one point even considered using payment intermediaries for
collecting taxes on Internet commerce. That proposal, however, failed in the face of opposition
from those intermediaries. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable
Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1257 (2001).
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the target of most complaints about failure to act to prevent the
auction of illegal goods.56
C. Existing (Fault-Based) Liability Schemes
Generally, the primary malfeasor is the actor who can most
efficiently prevent Internet-related misconduct. When an Internet
worm is released onto the Internet, for example, the person who can
most easily prevent the harm is the person who wrote the worm and
released it. For Internet gambling to be successful, both a gambler
and a gambling website must exist. If either is lacking, the gam-
bling will not occur. Thus, if either of these actors can be controlled
directly, then the social harm caused by Internet gambling can be
prevented. This direct approach is the path the law traditionally has
pursued.
But regulation that seeks to prevent misconduct through
controlling primary malfeasors is not always effective, particularly
when individuals are judgment proof or when prosecution is not
efficient either because of the high volume of transactions or
because of the low value of each transaction. Thus, to use the
obvious and well-known example, direct regulation of individuals
who share copyrighted material on the Internet has yet to effectively
decrease that type of conduct.57 The Internet's rise only exacerbates
that problem by making it easier for even solvent malfeasors
engaged in high-volume conduct to avoid responsibility either
through anonymity or through relocation to a jurisdiction outside
the influence of concerned policymakers.
When targeting primary malfeasors is ineffective, policymakers
must choose between allowing proscribed conduct harms to continue
unchecked" and identifying alternative regulatory strategies.
Generalizing broadly, existing formal policy responses have
56. See MANN & WINN, supra note 52, at 300, 305-07.
57. For some innovative approaches to solving the problem, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
PROMISES TO KEEP (2004); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1396-99 (2004).
58. As this Article discusses below, one realistic possibility is that responsible
policymakers have settled on a system that declares conduct unlawful only because the
conduct in fact cannot practicably be proscribed. In such a case, policymakers have no interest
in making enforcement more effective. Many would argue that P2P filesharing is or should
be such an area.
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proceeded along two paths, both of which have largely resulted in a
relatively broad freedom from liability for intermediaries.59 First, in
a variety of contexts, courts have applied traditional fault-based tort
principles to evaluate the conduct of intermediaries. Although
instances exist in which relatively egregious conduct has resulted
in liability, 6 many if not most of the cases have absolved intermedi-
aries from responsibility.61 Second, in contexts in which courts have
held open the prospect that intermediaries might have substantial
responsibility for the conduct of primary malfeasors, Congress has
intervened to overrule the cases by granting intermediaries broad
exemptions from liability.62 Because courts have interpreted those
statutes broadly, the statutes have the potential to provide consider-
able protection for intermediaries, even beyond the context that
motivated their enactment.63 Although the parallels are not perfect,
59. As this Article emphasizes throughout, regulators in a variety of contexts have
reached informal agreements with intermediaries in which intermediaries voluntarily agree
to cooperate. Most of those agreements seemingly do not reflect the view of the intermediaries
that they could be forced in litigation to provide that cooperation, but rather the view that a
failure to cooperate would result in formal legislative regulation: the settlements proceed not
in the shadow of existing law, but in the shadow of potential law. That seems to be one reason
why, for example, PayPal-hoping to avoid onerous state licensing requirements-seems to
have been more responsive to those efforts than entities like Visa and MasterCard. For a
discussion of state regulatory treatment of PayPal, see Mann, supra note 51, at 682.
60. SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,911-12 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
61. This Article does not take a view on the correctness of that doctrine but notes it as
part of the background that motivates this Article's thesis. For trenchant criticism, see
Lichtman & Landes, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
62. The most obvious example of this action can be found in the history of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Congress directly responded to the ISP liability found
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), by including immunity for ISPs in the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000)
(exempting ISPs for liability as the "publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider"), which was pending at the time of the case. James P.
Jenal, When Is a User Not a "User"? Finding the Proper Role for Republication Liability on the
Internet, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453, 459 (2004). Similarly, Title II of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, settled the tension over ISP
liability for copyright infringement committed by subscribers, which the courts created by
taking the opposite approach to the issue. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). Compare Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding liability), with Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(refusing to find liability).
63. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1091-92 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(holding that the DMCA shelters payment intermediaries from claims of copyright
infringement); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. App. 2002) (holding that the
CDA insulates eBay from claims for facilitating the sale of counterfeit goods).
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other jurisdictions seem to be taking a similar approach.64 The paths
share not only the reflexive and unreflective fear that recognition of
liability for intermediaries might be catastrophic to Internet
commerce but also a myopic focus on the idea that the inherent
passivity of Internet intermediaries makes it normatively inappro-
priate to impose responsibility on them for the conduct of primary
64. With some minor exceptions, other countries have also seen broad liability exemptions
for Internet intermediaries as the appropriate response to judicial findings of liability. The
United Kingdom parliament took no action after the Queen's Bench in Godfrey v. Demon
Internet Ltd., 2001 Q.B. 201 (1999), held an Internet service provider liable as the publisher
at common law of defamatory remarks posted by a user to a bulletin board. See Mitchell P.
Goldstein, Service Provider Liability for Acts Committed by Users: What You Don't Know Can
Hurt You, 18 J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 591, 640 (2000) (stating that Parliament was reviewing
the decision). In the United States, section 230 of the CDA apparently would prevent such a
finding of liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). Similarly, courts in France have held ISPs liable
for illegal actions of users. In one case, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris held Yahoo!
liable for violating a law banning the sale of Nazi objects after users of a Yahoo! auction site
posted outlawed materials. See UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. France, [T.G.I] [ordinary court
of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/
jurisfr/cti/yauctions2000522.htm; see also UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., [T.G.I] [ordinary
court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/
international/00120yahoofrance.pdf (discussing the order of May 22 and rejecting Yahoo!'s
contention that the order could not be carried out because of technological limitations). For
a nice summary of the Yahoo! case, see Reidenberg, supra note 24, at 215-17.
In 2000, however, the European Parliament passed Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000
O.J. (L 178) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexpri/enoj/dat/2000Al_1781_17820000717
enOO010016.pdf, which in many ways mimics the DMCA in providing immunity to ISPs when
they are acting merely as conduits for the transfer of copyrighted materials and when
copyright infringement is due to transient storage. Id. at art. 12, 13. Further, the Directive
forbids member states from imposing general duties to monitor on ISPs. Id. at art. 15. This
Directive is thus in opposition to the British and French approaches and requires those
countries to respond statutorily in much the same fashion as Congress responded to Stratton
Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, and Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361. Of course, courts are
always free to interpret the Directive or national legislation under the Directive as not
applying to the case at hand.
Canada has also passed legislation giving ISPs immunity similar to the DMCA. Canada's
Copyright Act states that
a person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other
subject-matter to the public consists of providing the means of
telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the work or
other subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter
to the public.
R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 2.4(1)(b) (1997) (Can.). The Canadian Supreme Court interpreted this
provision to exempt an ISP from liability when it acted merely as a "conduit." Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Assoc. of Internet Providers,
240 D.L.R. 193, 92 (Can. 2004). The court in that case also interpreted the statute to require
something akin to the DMCA's takedown provision. See id. 110.
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malfeasors. That idea is flawed both in its generalization about the
passivity of intermediaries and in its failure to consider the
possibility that the intermediaries, without regard to their blame-
worthiness, might be the most effective sources of regulatory
enforcement.
The recent litigation involving Perfect 10, Inc. is a salient
example of the ineffectiveness of tort principles in imposing liability
on Internet intermediaries.65 Perfect 10 owns copyrights in a large
number of arguably pornographic66 photographs, which it exploits
through a printed periodical and a website."7 Apparently, because
of the photographs' significant commercial value, they have
appeared regularly on a substantial number of websites without
Perfect 10's consent and thus in flagrant violation of Perfect 10's
rights .under copyright law.6" The primary defendants' open
contempt for intellectual property rights in these cases is evidenced
by the common practice of taking Perfect 10 photographs of
relatively unknown models and attaching to them a photograph of
a widely recognized celebrity, such as Jessica Simpson.69
To protect its intellectual property, Perfect 10 instituted several
separate causes of action. The most directly responsible defendant
was probably Cybernet, a company that operated a system for
verifying customers' age by using credit card accounts.7" Among its
various activities, Cybernet operated a consortium of privately run
Internet websites that provided pornographic material.71 To
facilitate this network, Cybernet charged customers a monthly fee
65. The account of the Perfect 10 litigation in this Article draws not only on the various
published opinions in the litigation, but also on pleadings obtained from PACER.
66. The term "pornography" is used loosely in this Article to refer to material marketed
with claims of a generally prurient appeal. No effort is made to distinguish between material
that is or is not protected by the First Amendment or between content that is or is not lawful
under applicable state and federal laws. The discussion in Part III is limited to child
pornography so as to avoid the difficult line-drawing questions inherent in the regulation of
adult-related businesses more broadly. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002)
(consideration of those problems by a divided Court).
67. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc. (Cybernet 1), 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1117-18
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
68. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc. (Cybernet I1), 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1163-64
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
69. Cybernet 1, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1118, 1125.
70. Cybernet II, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1157-58. The system's utility generally rests on the not
entirely accurate assumption that minors are not holders of credit card accounts. See id.
71. Id. at 1158-59.
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and provided those customers with a password that could be used
to access more than 300,000 privately run pornographic websites
Perfect 10 claimed that Cybernet was liable for direct, contributory,
and vicarious copyright infringement; direct and contributory
trademark infringement; and unfair competition.73 Although Perfect
10 lost on many of those claims, the district court concluded that
Cybernet's participation in the copyright infringement on the sites
in its network was sufficient to justify preliminary injunctive relief
on claims for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, and
aiding and abetting unfair competition.74
Of more interest to this Article, however, are Perfect 10's actions
against Visa, MasterCard, and Google.75 Perfect 10 claimed, for
example, that Visa and other companies that facilitated the credit
card transactions were liable for contributory copyright infringe-
ment because they enabled Cybernet websites to operate
profitably.76 Among other things, Visa and MasterCard clearly were
aware of the dubious nature of Cybernet's activities because high
chargeback rates on Cybernet transactions had motivated both
networks to place Cybernet in a category for high-risk merchants.77
Although unclear from the opinions, the pleadings plainly show that
one consequence of placing Cybernet in that category is that Visa
and MasterCard charged higher-than-normal fees to Cybernet.78
In what seems a perfectly plausible application of existing law,
the court had little difficulty in dismissing the action against Visa
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1165-89.
74. Id. at 1168-69, 1171, 1174, 1184, 1186-87.
75. Perfect 10 also instituted litigation against a number of less prominent intermediaries,
including a group of related entities that included ISPs, payment intermediaries, and search
engine providers. For the most part, the analysis in that litigation turned on details of
copyright law that are not interesting for this Article's purposes. For example, the court
dismissed some of Perfect 10's claims based on Perfect 10's failure to send notices that
complied with the DMCA, dismissed others for failure to show any defects in the entity's
policy for terminating repeat infringers, and allowed some actions to proceed based on the
failure of the defendant to submit any such policy. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1086-103 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
76. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intl Serv. Ass'n, No. C04-0371 JW, 2004 WL 1773349, at *1-2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004).
77. Id. at *2.
78. Complaint at 12-19, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intl Serv. Ass'n, 2004 WL 1773349 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0371 JW).
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and MasterCard.79 The court relied heavily on the content neutrality
of Visa and MasterCard services:
Unlike Cybernet, Defendants provide content-neutral services.
Defendants do not promote the websites that use their services.
Nor do Defendants have content-specific regulations with which
merchants must comply before using Defendants [sic] services,
as Cybernet did. Defendants do not hold out certain merchants
as being providers of a particular quality of product. Defendants
are concerned solely with financial aspects of the websites, not
their content.80
These cases should be analyzed quite differently. The approach
of the courts exonerates Visa and condemns Cybernet based on the
conclusion that Visa's level of participation in the misconduct was
considerably less than Cybernet's. In terms of equity, Visa has clean
hands and Cybernet does not. That might make sense in a legal
system designed to force bad actors to provide redress to injured
parties. The better question, albeit one not readily susceptible to
judicial analysis, is whether either Visa or Cybernet is the party
best situated to stop the copyright violations in question. On that
point, Visa probably is better situated because of the real world
likelihood that none of the sites that foster the infringement could
survive as a profitable commercial enterprise without accepting Visa
payments."1 This does not mean that Cybernet should be exempt
from traditional copyright liability if its participation in the conduct
is sufficiently direct, which it seems to be. It does mean, however,
that a separate form of liability for Visa and MasterCard should be
considered, one that rests not on the degree of passivity but rather
79. The action against Google has not yet been resolved. Google now faces a similar action
brought by the French news agency Agence France Presse. See Lisa Baertlein, Agence France
Presse Sues Over Google News, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2005, available at http://www.reuters.coml
newsArticle.jhtml?type=InternetNews&storylD=7949422.
80. Perfect 10, Inc., 2004 WL 1773349 at *3.
81. This Article assumes that any rule would apply equally to MasterCard, Visa, and the
leading payment intermediaries, so that a ruling in favor of Perfect 10 would prevent the sites
from accepting payments from any of the dominant providers. To the extent the court erred,
it did so in its assumption that a ruling against the payment intermediaries would have no
effect on Cybernet's business. Id. at *4. Cybernet would be highly unlikely to survive as a
profitmaking entity without access to one of a small number of dominant payment
intermediaries.
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on the structural relation between the payment providers and the
challenged conduct.
II. LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT: INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES AS
GATEKEEPERS
A. The Basic Premise
This Article's basic premise is that the response described above
is a wrong turn. Fundamentally, this Article argues that responding
to Internet-related misconduct with rules for intermediaries that
turn so pervasively on normative and fault-related notions of
responsibility and participation is inadequate. The touchstone this
Article suggests-searching for the least-cost avoider-is not novel.
Moreover, the idea that in some cases misconduct can be sanctioned
most effectively through the indirect imposition of responsibility on
intermediaries is also not new. That idea is prominently associated
with Reinier Kraakman's two papers written in the 1980s on
"gatekeeper" liability." To understand the idea's importance, it is
necessary to examine both the gatekeeper regime's distinctive
nature and the reasons it is so well suited to the Internet.
1. The Nature of Gatekeeper Liability
The first point is the simplest one and the one already empha-
sized above: the imposition of liability under the gatekeeper
rationale should have nothing to do with a normative assessment of
the level of responsibility, participation, or support of the intermedi-
ary. Rather, it should turn entirely on the balance between the
misconduct's social costs and how effectively the intermediary can
sanction the misconduct."3 This does not make imposing liability in
cases in which the intermediary is directly involved in the miscon-
duct inappropriate. For example, in Napster, one could conclude on
a fair assessment of the facts, as the Ninth Circuit did, that Napster
82. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies]; Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers].
83. For more on this calculus, see infra Part III.
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was so involved in unlawful P2P filesharing 4 as to justify imposing
liability on Napster for that misconduct.85 The gatekeeper inquiry,
however, would turn on the question of whether Napster could
reliably serve to prevent unlawful filesharing. As this Article
discusses below, imposing gatekeeper responsibility on Napster
would likely have been ineffective because no actions by Napster
could possibly have stopped unlawful filesharing.'
To put the point affirmatively, the key question for determining
the propriety of intermediary liability is the plausibility that the
intermediary could detect the misconduct and prevent it. 87 Specifi-
cally, because the analysis premises the imposition of responsibility
on a determination that the intermediary is the least-cost avoider
of the misconduct in question, a proper determination requires not
only that the gatekeepers be able to detect offenses, but also that
they be able to detect and prevent them economically. Thus, for
example, if the sole effect of the regulation of a particular intermedi-
ary will be to motivate illicit actors to shift constantly to ever more
elusive intermediaries without effecting the underlying misconduct,
then the regulation's costs are likely to be a total loss. This suggests
that the central factor in assessing the best regulatory strategy
must be the market structure of the various intermediaries:
intermediaries with sufficient market power to prevent illicit actors
from moving to substitutes are better targets than those for whom
ready substitutes exist. Thus, continuing with the example above,
focusing attention and regulatory resources on entities like Napster,
Grokster, and their progeny makes sense only if one could plausibly
believe that their eradication would stop piracy. Conversely,
attention to the dominant payment intermediaries like Visa and
84. This assumes that little personal music trading constitutes fair use under the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), a conclusion that is not entirely clear.
85. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-23 (9th Cir. 2001).
86. As that discussion emphasizes, this Article does not suggest that Napster could not
have stopped filesharing on its network. On the cohtrary, it seems plain that Napster readily
could have eliminated the great majority of unlawful filesharing on its network. This Article's
point is the more systemic one, namely that eliminating Napster and Grokster will do little
to slow unlawful filesharing, which in the absence of a significant escalation in the ability of
content providers to intervene in the Internet's architecture will continue to proceed on ever
more elusive networks. For a cautionary note on the risks of such intervention, see Zittrain,
supra note 28.
87. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 82, at 889-92; Kraakman,
Gatekeepers, supra note 82, at 53-54.
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Mastercard is particularly effective in contexts where the illicit
conduct depends directly on access to the facilities of those interme-
diaries.
The point is not to make a definitive assessment of the potential
technological responses, which would be beyond the capabilities of
this Article's authors and, in any event, short lived in its accuracy.88
Rather, the point is simply to emphasize that a strategy utilizing
intermediaries makes sense only in contexts where the inevitable
Posts can be balanced against benefits in real reductions rather than
in relocations of misconduct.89
2. Gatekeeper Liability and the Internet
The second point is an overtly exceptionalist argument that
gatekeeper liability is systematically more likely to be effective in
the modern Internet environment than it has been in traditional
offline environments.9" This is true for three reasons. First, as
should be clear from the discussion of the Internet's structure in
88. For example, one could realistically think that ISPs or even a consumer's own
computer soon could be put in a position to monitor the particular applications the ISPs'
customers use. See Zittrain, supra note 28, at 70-71. If this sounds implausible, consider the
conventional wisdom that manufacturers of photocopiers cannot build their machines to
prevent private copyright infringement. See, e.g., Lichtman & Landes, supra note 30, at 409
("[A]lthough firms that produce photocopiers might not be able to discourage piracy directly,
they can easily build into their prices a small fee that could in turn be used to compensate
injured copyright holders."). But as the relentless march forward of technology continues, this
conventional wisdom is brought into doubt when one learns about new technologies being
implemented, such as the one the U.S. Treasury is using to fight currency counterfeiting. The
technology gives digital scanners the ability to recognize currency when it is scanned. The
scanners then override the scan and direct users to a website that contains information about
the use of currency images. Ted Bridis, Low-Quality Images of New $50 Bill Offered; Making
Digital Copies Is Getting More Difficult, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Oct. 10, 2004, at
B13. Obviously it is much easier to build a scanner that recognizes one particular image that
it should not copy than it is to produce a copier that can detect any one of millions of
copyrighted works. The point is, however, that technological advances should never be
underestimated.
89. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831 (2005) (arguing for a comprehensive
structure to the United States criminal justice system to remove competition between local
jurisdictions that attempt to relocate crime to neighboring jurisdictions).
90. Joel Reidenberg notes the possibility that intermediary enforcement might be "more
efficient" if illegal activities are "channeled through gateway points." Reidenberg, supra note
24, at 224. He does not, however, focus as this Article does on the systematic reasons why that
might be so.
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Part I, a particular type of misconduct on the Internet will often
proceed through a readily identifiable intermediary or class of
intermediaries, and it will not at reasonable cost be practicable for
those who wish to engage in misconduct to avoid such an intermedi-
ary: the customer who wishes to purchase contraband on the
Internet will interact with a site that describes or provides the
contraband and will likely use some form of payment intermediary
to pay for the contraband. This is of course a substantial change
from offline reality, in which the seller of contraband need not
establish a freely accessible place of business and in which wholly
untraceable cash payments are the standard.
Second, advances in information technology make it increasingly
cost effective for intermediaries to monitor more closely the
activities of those who use their networks. As monitoring activity
becomes cheaper, it ineluctably becomes relatively"' more desirable
to rely on such monitoring as the least expensive way to eradicate
undesirable activity.92
Third, the relative anonymity the Internet fosters makes
remedies against primary malfeasors less effective than in the
brick-and-mortar context. For example, obtaining a relatively
anonymous e-mail account from a provider such as Google for use in
illicit conduct is easier than obtaining a post office box in the offline
world. This is not to say that anonymity is impossible in the offline
world or perfect in the online world; engaging in relatively anony-
mous conduct online is simply easier than it ever has been offline.
But, with the introduction of intermediaries in targeting certain
activities, this anonymity decreases significantly. The networks
intermediaries provide, whether communication networks in the
case of ISPs, payment systems in the case of payment intermediar-
ies, or auction systems in the case of auction intermediaries, require
those networks' users to be identifiable to varying extents. ISPs
91. This Article suggests only that it becomes relatively more desirable. As emphasized
throughout, the costs of monitoring in many cases might make large scale monitoring
unjustified except in cases of serious misconduct.
92. This point can be overstated. Just as technology in the last few years seems to have
made monitoring easier, technology in the near future will possibly make it easier for
wrongdoers to avoid monitoring. As discussed below, this likely has been happening in the
filesharing area, where advances in P2P technology have made it difficult to locate and
identify resourceful filesharers and those who assist them. However, whether this always will
be so is unclear. See Zittrain, supra note 28, at 72-73.
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provide service to an identifiable account holder. The electronic
payment systems currently in widespread use require transfers to
and from identifiable accounts, while auction intermediaries obtain
personal information to facilitate the smooth operation of auctions
and ensure payment. Thus, when these types of intermediaries are
engaged in the battle against an activity, the information they
collect to provide their services automatically and necessarily
decreases the transactions' anonymity.
B. Variations on the Theme
Traditional discussions of gatekeeper and intermediary liability
have proceeded on the implicit assumption that a standard damage
remedy will be used to induce the intermediary to curtail miscon-
duct by the primary malfeasors that are under the intermediary's
control. Thus, one of the principal topics in the literature has been
the question of whether the liability of the gatekeeper should be
strict or based on negligence or fault.93 A more contextual assess-
ment of the multifarious types of Internet intermediaries, however,
suggests that a wider array of policy options should be considered.
For present purposes, a description of three types of remedies will
suffice: a traditional tort remedy for damages; a takedown regime,
such as the DMCA; and a "hot-list" regime, which is common in
bank regulation.
A traditional tort remedy imposes the greatest risk on the
intermediary because, depending on the details, it leaves the
intermediary exposed to damages if the intermediary fails to take
adequate steps to detect and control misconduct.94 If the risk of
liability is not readily predictable or cabined, that remedy is likely
to have adverse collateral effects, such as overdeterrence.95 That
problem is particularly serious when the remedy applies to miscon-
duct that the intermediary cannot entirely avoid. Consider, for
93. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003).
94. This problem of course could be mitigated if the remedy were a statutory fine in a fixed
amount. In that case, the key question would be how to set the fine so as to provide the
appropriate incentive.
95. For example, cyberlaw scholars commonly worry that imposing any liability on
intermediaries for their customers' actions will lead to the prohibition of anonymous postings,
which will have adverse effects on the Internet polity. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property
and Innovation in the Global Information Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 325.
2005] 269
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
example, a regime in which an ISP is responsible for copyright
infringement for all unlawful filesharing in which its customers
engage. If monitoring technology makes detecting some but not all
of the conduct in question feasible for the ISP, then a remedy
holding the ISP strictly liable for the misconduct will likely have a
considerable adverse effect on all users, either through restrictions
on service or an increase in price. Conversely, because a damages
remedy applies only ex post, it would have the undeterring aspect
of having no effect on the conduct of financially irresponsible
intermediaries. The schemes with more objective ex ante require-
ments discussed below would be more effective in pinpointing
irresponsible intermediaries and removing their ability to facilitate
misconduct.
The second potential remedy is a takedown scheme. The paradig-
matic example, the DMCA provisions codified in section 512 of the
Copyright Act,96 generally obligate covered intermediaries to remove
allegedly illicit conduct promptly upon receipt of an adequate notice
of the misconduct.97 Although this scheme does impose obligations
on the intermediaries, it imposes a relatively small risk of liability
because it generally carries an implicit exemption from monetary
relief if the intermediary complies with appropriate takedown
notices.9 " Thus, this response is less costly, and can be justified as
a response to a problem with lower social costs than the problems
that would justify a damages remedy.
At the same time, this response is less effective because it does
not enlist the intermediary's aid in identifying and removing illicit
material. The dispute between Tiffany & Co. and eBay illustrates
the problem.9 Suppose, as seems likely to be the case, that eBay is
96. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000). "
97. Id. Such a system of course could be designed more or less effectively. For example,
the DMCA may impose excessive costs by giving intermediaries an incentive to remove
material upon the receipt of ill-founded notices and by providing unduly burdensome avenues
of review to the party whose information is taken down.
98. Id. A possibility, not yet settled in the courts, remains that an intermediary could have
traditional liability for direct participation in the initial posting even if the intermediary
complied with a takedown notice after the fact. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373
F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004).
99. See generally Psst, Wanna Buy a Cheap Bracelet?, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2004, at 13
(describing the controversy between Tiffany & Co. and eBay, and concluding that liability for
eBay is wrong because of the immense difficulty of monitoring auctions and verifying whether
items offered for auction are genuine).
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more than willing to remove from its auction site any postings for
materials that Tiffany can identify to eBay as falsely claiming to be
Tiffany trademarked products. Yet eBay still might sell millions of
dollars of counterfeit Tiffany products each year, solely because of
the difficulty Tiffany would face in identifying each counterfeit
product rapidly enough to forestall a successful auction. Tiffany
might plausibly think that eBay could identify those auctions more
effectively than Tiffany and wish that eBay were obligated to do so.
A takedown remedy, rather than a damage remedy, would provide
little help to Tiffany in that circumstance.
The final response is a "hot list" scheme, which is common in the
financial industry. Generally, in this type of scheme, a reliable
actor, such as the government, identifies a list of illicit actors. In its
most common application, banks have for years been prevented from
wiring money to any entity on the federal government's list of
entities that support terrorist activity. 00 This scheme is likely to
provide the most predictable liability exposure to intermediaries
because their obligations are purely ministerial. Indeed, with
advances in information technology that presumably would allow
such lists to be examined automatically, 1 ' violations by the
intermediaries might be rare. Of course, this scheme goes further
than the takedown scheme to shift the burden of monitoring away
from the intermediary. Here, the government must expend suffi-
cient resources to identify the illicit actors even before the criminal
transactions begin.'0 2 Thus, this response will be useful only in
100. In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush by
executive order made it illegal to transfer property to certain persons listed initially by the
Executive Order and subsequently by the Secretary of State. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66
Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). Today, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, part of the
Department of the Treasury, maintains a list of designated foreign nationals for whom banks
are forbidden to facilitate transactions. For more on these regulations, see OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSET CONTROL, FOREIGNASSETS CONTROLREGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY 5-43
(2005) [hereinafter OFAC REPORT], available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/regulations/tl lfacbk.pdf.
101. Lists of designated persons are availablefor download in a variety of electronic forms
to increase the ease with which financial intermediaries can integrate required blocking into
their existing systems. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, SDN and Blocked Persons,
http://www.treas.gov/officeslenforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
102. The text assumes that regulators will not delegate to private entities the ability to
designate those placed on "hot lists," and that regulatory decisions on that point will be made
under procedures that provide reasonable notice and opportunity for review. Systems that did
not provide those safeguards would be more costly and thus less justifiable.
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situations where the illicit transactions are likely to have a readily
identifiable and relatively stable location.
Of course, this Article provides only a simple list of options. One
can easily imagine responses that combine features from the various
options. Most obviously, the framework above does not specify what
the remedy would be for failing to comply with a take down or "hot-
list" requirement. The remedy for such a failure could be calibrated
to extend only to a loss of immunity, which is the result under the
existing DMCA regime, or could extend more broadly to secondary
liability for the unlawful activity, or perhaps to some intermediate
sanction, such as a fine in an amount less than that which would be
imposed for the illicit activity.
C. A Framework for Analysis
Undoubtedly, the foregoing subparts will strike some as evincing
undue optimism about the value of imposing liability on intermedi-
aries, as well as a blithe lack of concern about the costs that liability
will have on the intermediaries and those who depend on their
services. That is not, however, because this Article is unaware of or
unconcerned about those costs, but rather because describing the
structure and premises of the proposed liability is necessary before
this Article can describe how policymakers should use the tool. Nor
should the discussion be taken as directly critical of the efforts of
judges working under existing law. The liability schemes that this
Article envisions are plainly not the type of thing readily adopted
through the development of the common law. This Article's frame-
work is intended to provide fodder for legislators and regulators, not
for judges. °3 Hopefully, this Article's analysis can lead to well-
specified statutory schemes or regulatory initiatives. Among other
things, a general directive to courts to implement intermediary
liability easily could shade into judicial doctrines that would
obligate all actors to stop all misconduct whenever possible. As
Judge Posner recently explained, such an unbounded principle
would be unduly disruptive.0 4 In contrast, this Article hopes that
103. For analysis criticizing the doctrine judges have developed under the existing
statutory scheme for piracy, see Lichtman & Landes, supra note 30, at 404-10 (arguing that
broad ISP exemptions are inconsistent with traditional rules of tort liability).
104. Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 955-56 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the state regulators who currently are searching for tools to respond
to offensive Internet-related conduct will consult the framework
that this Article articulates so that the informal responses that they
seek and increasingly obtain will reflect an appropriate sensitivity
to the costs their remedies impose.
Furthermore, this Article expresses no views on the social
benefits to be gained from eradicating any of the various forms of
misconduct discussed in Part III. The relevant policymaker should
make that judgment call: this Article, for example, expresses no
opinion on the relative social benefits to be obtained from limiting
the sale of counterfeit goods, the sharing of copyrighted music, and
the dissemination of child pornography. In each case, those benefits,
whatever they might be, must be weighed against the costs of
imposing intermediary liability. As the discussion above empha-
sizes, the relevant benefits are the value of eradicating the miscon-
duct that the particular liability scheme in fact will eradicate.
At the same time, the costs of any of these regimes are likely to
be substantial. 105 The existing literature focuses on two general
categories of costs, which seem illustrative. It is well recognized that
imposing liability on intermediaries will affect the services and
prices they present to their customers. 106 If regulation increases
costs substantially, some customers, such as those who derive net
benefits from the service that are less than the newly imposed costs,
will stop using the gatekeeper's service. In some cases, and espe-
cially as the cost of liability to the gatekeepers increases signifi-
cantly, the problem may spiral out of control, such that the only
remaining customers will be those who use the gatekeeper's services
in highly rewarding ways.10 7 In situations where the remaining
users are predominantly those committing the targeted acts, the
regulation's ultimate effects are likely to be counterproductive."0 '
Another problem is that gatekeeper liability might upset the
market balance for the services provided by gatekeepers. Specifi-
105. For a thorough discussion, see Hamdani, supra note 93, at 63-82.
106. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 82, at 891-92 ("[F]irms will
... pay for the risk of additional liability in the familiar ways. If outside gatekeepers cannot
shift their liability risks, they will charge high risk premiums."); Kraakman, Gatekeepers,
supra note 82, at 77, 93-94.
107. This is the problem of "unraveling" markets, discussed in detail by Hamdani. See
Hamdani, supra note 93, at 74-76.
108. Id. at 76-80.
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cally, a risk always exists that imposing additional burdens on
intermediaries will chill the provision of valuable goods and
services. 109 That will be especially problematic in cases where
considerable risk of chilling legal conduct that is adjacent to the
targeted conduct exists. As discussed below, that might tend to
make the use of intermediaries less plausible in file-sharing
contexts where determining whether any particular act of file
sharing is illegal is difficult, and more plausible in the gambling
context where in many cases substantially all traffic to a particular
site likely involves illegal conduct. Requiring intermediaries to
make those kind of subjective decisions imposes costs not only on
the intermediaries that must make those decisions, but also on the
underlying actors whose conduct might be filtered incorrectly. To
the extent the regulation affects conduct with positive social
value,110 as is likely in at least some of the contexts this Article
discusses, the direct and indirect effects on that conduct must be
counted as costs of any regulatory initiative."' Thus, this Article
emphasizes that in any particular case, the costs of any particular
regime described in this Article might exceed the benefits that could
accrue from implementing the regime, and in such a case a new
regime should not be supported.
But the premise of any regulatory state is that society success-
fully can impose burdens on actors that will provide substantial
social benefits while not overdeterring those individuals from
providing their services. This is evident when the local, state, and
federal governments impose tax burdens on private actors. Taxes
are an additional burden on business, but in situations where the
taxes are well designed, society can benefit both through the
provision of taxable goods and services by business and also through
the government's use of the tax revenues.
109. Id. at 76-77.
110. Assaf Hamdani emphasizes the point that this problem will be particularly serious
because intermediaries will fully internalize the sanctions they will face for failure to filter
with sufficient vigor, but will not internalize the social costs of excessive filtering. Id. at 73.
111. Sonia Katyal has written extensively on the social costs imposed by section 512 of the
DMCA, which she argues copyright holders, frustrated by the difficulty of protecting their
property in the digital environment, have used to harass individuals, thus oftentimes
curtailing legitimate activity. Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222,
281-90 (2004). These represent one subset of the costs that should be considered when
evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed legislation.
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In sum, this Article poses a traditional cost-benefit calculation, in
which the policymaker should assess the costs, broadly defined, of
the particular scheme of intermediary liability. If those costs exceed
the benefits, then the particular form of intermediary liability might
be appropriate. If they do not, then the new liability is not appropri-
ate.
III. APPLICATIONS TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF CONDUCT
The nuance that is necessary to do a responsible job of enlisting
intermediaries in the quest to cabin misconduct on the Internet can
best be seen through concrete examples. For purposes of this Article,
two categories of misconduct are useful: wrongful dissemination of
content and breaches of security. The first category broadly includes
the use of the Internet to provide material that violates applicable
law. The examples on which this Article focuses are trafficking in
contraband or counterfeit goods, Internet gambling, child pornogra-
phy, and sharing copyrighted files. The second category includes
breaches of security, such as viruses, hacking, and spam, which
threaten the integrity of the computer systems that have become so
essential to our modern economy.
A. Dissemination of Content
The basic problem with regulating content in an Internet era is
that content can reside on any computer in the world that can be
connected to the Internet. Thus, regulations that prohibit the
dissemination of particular content often cannot reach those that
make content available in places where it is unlawful. A
policymaker could respond to that situation in a number of ways: by
accepting a status quo in which laws on the books tacitly are flouted
by widespread Internet conduct, by formalizing the futility of
regulation by abandoning the regulations entirely, or by adopting a
new system of regulation that is more effective than targeting
primary malfeasors. The analysis in this subpart does not advocate
any of these options for the particular types of misconduct that this
Article addresses. Rather, this Article's aim is a more modest one:
to illustrate the features of particular situations that might make
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a specific form of intermediary liability a more or less useful device
for limiting misconduct.
1. Trafficking in Contraband and Counterfeit Products
The simplest problem is the problem of contraband and counter-
feit products. To use the prominent example discussed above,
112
Tiffany & Co. has been engaged in a long-running dispute with eBay
about the sale of counterfeit Tiffany & Co. merchandise on eBay.
Other obvious problems, however, have drawn attention from
regulators: the sale to U.S. residents of pharmaceuticals that are
principally from Canadian retailers" 3 and that have not been
approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
the sale of cigarettes in violation of local and federal tax laws" 4 are
notable.
In some ways, these situations are more tractable than the
situations discussed in the sections that follow, because much of the
conduct is likely to involve the shipment of products to addresses
located in jurisdictions where the sale of the product is plainly
illegal. "' Thus, for example, one could easily see that Massachusetts
should be able to proscribe the shipment of firearms to an address
physically located in Massachusetts." 6 A rule limited to such
shipments would be underinclusive, as it would not bar shipments
to addresses outside Massachusetts even if the products ultimately
would be distributed in Massachusetts. Additionally, the rule would
perhaps be overinclusive, as some shipments to Massachusetts
addresses might be intended for use outside the Commonwealth.
Yet, a practical scheme for prohibiting such shipments would go a
long way, particularly in states larger than Massachusetts, in
prohibiting the targeted conduct and would impose relatively little
cost on innocent third parties: it is not too much to ask of persons
112. See supra text accompanying note 99.
113. See Gaul & Flaherty, supra note 20.
114. See supra note 19.
115. Conduct that does not involve physical shipments is harder to deal with both because
of the threshold question of whether the illegal conduct in fact occurs in the targeted
jurisdiction (for example, how exactly do we decide where online gambling occurs?) and
because of the consequent difficulty in designing practical ways for intermediaries to identify
illegal conduct that is adequately related to the regulating jurisdiction.
116. See Press Release, Massachusetts Attorney General, supra note 26.
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who want to buy guns that are illegal in Massachusetts that they
provide a mailing address outside the Commonwealth. Even in cases
of nonuniform regulation, such as firearms or wine, the analogy of
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project 17 suggests that under current
technology, responsible retailers should be able to refrain from
shipping contraband into prohibited jurisdictions.
In some cases, however, direct enforcement against a retailer will
be ineffective. For example, a jurisdiction might face a large number
of small, relatively irresponsible retailers, so that direct enforce-
ment would be prohibitively expensive in practice. Additional
examples include cases in which the retailer takes advantage of the
relative anonymity an auction site like eBay affords or cases in
which the retailer is located in a jurisdiction outside the United
States that will not cooperate with the relevant state regulators.
Importantly, even in those cases, the business model for the primary
malfeasors generally involves a product's retail sale in return for
monetary compensation. Among other things, this generally
involves the existence of a website where the nature and availability
of the product is evident to all, at least in an era of effective search
engines. This has several ramifications for the design of a policy
response. Most obviously, it means that intermediaries often would
be able to detect and control the conduct. This Article discusses in
the next two sections auction intermediaries and payment interme-
diaries, which seem to be the simplest and most common possibili-
ties.
a. Targeting Auction Intermediaries
Auction intermediaries are particularly relevant for the problem
of counterfeit trademarked goods-the other contraband problems
mentioned above tend to involve offshore suppliers of products that
violate local regulatory schemes. In contrast, eBay is an entity with
a major domestic presence that owns facilities through which a
substantial amount of counterfeit goods are sold. In that context,
eBay could clearly detect and prohibit many of the sales of counter-
feit Tiffany & Co. products at its site."' The real question then is
117. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project (Jan. 2005), http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/
execsum0O105.pdf. For discussion, see Cockfield, supra note 10, at 386-88, 397-98.
118. Tiffany & Co. complains of sales of products that are falsely advertised as Tiffany &
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whether the burden should be on Tiffany & Co. to locate counterfeit
products and bring them to eBay's attention, as under a DMCA
take-down regime, or whether the burden should be on eBay in the
first instance to locate those products and remove them.
Viewed from the perspective set forth above, the relevant policy
considerations are easy to discern. On the one hand, one could
plausibly think that eBay is better placed to identify those products
in the first instance. Surely eBay is more adept at searching and
monitoring its marketplace than Tiffany & Co., while eBay probably
is not as effective as Tiffany & Co. in distinguishing bona fide
Tiffany products from counterfeits.119 The net benefit of shifting that
task to eBay from Tiffany & Co., namely the combination of cost
savings and any increased detection of misconduct, is the potential
benefit of intermediary liability in this context. The magnitude of
that benefit is difficult to quantify because it depends in part on the
social value of the increased detection of that misconduct. The costs
of shifting that task to eBay, on the other hand, are the burdens
eBay would impose on all users. Among other things, those burdens
are likely to diminish the functionality of eBay's site by setting up
additional steps that will slow the availability of innocent users'
postings.
If the social benefits of removing the contraband or counterfeit
products are high enough, imposing a damages regime might be
plausible, under which eBay and other intermediaries would be
strictly liable for this conduct. Given the difficulties eBay would face
in complying with a mandate to remove all counterfeit products,
however, adopting a takedown regime of some kind might be more
plausible, such as a regime under which eBay would be obligated to
Co. products and also of products that appear to bear a counterfeit Tiffany & Co. mark but are
not advertised as such. See Psst, Wanna Buy a Cheap Bracelet?, supra note 99, at 13. The first
category apparently could be detected by textual searches of advertising copy. The second
category would be more difficult to detect without a search engine that could visually search
for a particular mark. The development of such a search engine-certainly plausible under
existing technology-well might shift the appropriate locus of responsibility.
119. Indeed, assuming that monitoring is the lowest-cost method of eradicating contraband
from eBay may be a mistake. For example, circumstances can be imagined in which a lower
net burden might be imposed on eBay's business if eBay required bonds from its customers
to ensure their compliance with applicable restrictions on contraband. Given the small size
and presumptive illiquidity of many eBay merchants, this does not seem to be the optimal
response. The main point, however, is that eBay plainly is better situated than Tiffany & Co.
in assessing the relative costs of different remedies.
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remove all counterfeit products for the owners of famous marks 120
who made a suitable request.'2 ' Similarly, permitting eBay to
impose those costs on the content owner might make sense,
particularly if compliance costs would be sufficiently great that they
might alter the pricing of eBay's services to all customers. For
example, eBay could be permitted to charge content owners, such as
Tiffany & Co., a "reasonable fee" for complying with a statutory
mandate to remove counterfeit products. 22
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries
To the extent that contraband and counterfeit products tend to be
sold from a stable site,123 the payment intermediary also can serve
120. This is not as vague as it sounds because "famous marks" is a term of art defined in
section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
121. This would differ from the existing DMCA take-down regime because the notice from
the content owner would not identify specific products to be removed, but rather specific
marks to be examined.
122. This would more directly link the cost of eliminating the harms to the entity that
benefits from their elimination. Whether this should be done depends on one's view of the
baseline: Is Tiffany & Co. entitled to a world free of trademark dilution resulting from eBay's
business, or is eBay entitled to a world in which it can freely connect buyers and sellers? To
put it in economic terms, why can one view the risk to Tiffany & Co. as an externality created
by eBay's new business, which eBay should be forced to internalize to ensure that its business
increases net social value? From that perspective, one likely view is that it is appropriate to
require the trademark owner to pay the reasonable compliance costs to ensure that the
private value of the mark exceeds the transaction costs of the takedown. In a perfect world,
the baseline would be irrelevant because the trademark owner would negotiate to purchase
a takedown from eBay if that were an efficient outcome. Some reason exists to think that
might happen where, as in this case, transaction costs between two large companies are low
when compared to the value of the rights being negotiated. Of course, it would be naive to
think that the selection of a particular baseline as a legal rule would be irrelevant. As
Bebchuk explains, the selection of a particular liability baseline is likely to have significant
long-run effects in many contexts on the allocation of investments related to the activity in
question. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View
of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 605-06 (2001). The problem is quite similar to the
problem of default rules in contracting, where the modern literature recognizes that the choice
of the default rule has important implications for the ultimate allocation of resources. See
Ronald J. Mann, Contracts-Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1896-901 (2004).
This problem is much less relevant to the sections of this Article's analysis, such as child
pornography and gambling, where the dispute over liability involves the government and a
commercial party rather than two commercial parties. In those situations, one can hardly
imagine, for example, the government taking a payment from eBay to allow eBay to continue
facilitating transactions involving contraband.
123. This Article discusses below in the context of child pornography the difficulties of
regulating material that appears at a site without a stable domain name and IP address. That
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a useful role and perhaps a broader role given the importance of
payment to the offshore venues from which contraband goods are
shipped into the United States. As discussed above, roughly eighty
percent of modern Internet retail transactions use a credit or debit
card as a payment vehicle. 2 4 Furthermore, although precise data is
difficult to locate, all of those transactions pass through a small
handful of networks, and the lion's share of those transactions
taking place in the United States make payment either through the
Visa or MasterCard networks. This means that a remedy preventing
one of those small number of networks from making payments to
sites that sell contraband or counterfeit goods would make it
relatively difficult for such sites to survive. 125 The biggest problem
is the difficulty a payment intermediary might face in identifying
the targeted transactions.
Collectively, those features suggest that the payment intermedi-
ary is a relatively ineffective target for responsibility for the
counterfeit goods discussed above, especially where the auction
intermediary might be better placed to identify the illicit transac-
tions. At the same time, in areas where regulators can identify sites
dominated by unlawful purchases, such as sites selling untaxed
cigarettes or unapproved pharmaceuticals, imposing a 'hot-list"
requirement on a payment intermediary might be most effective. In
practice, regulators are becoming increasingly adept at securing
voluntary agreements to such requirements, apparently out of the
payment intermediaries' desire to forestall more intrusive and
formal regulation."1
6
possibility raises a technological question of great importance to the regime suggested here.
Suppose, for example, that imposition of any of the regimes discussed here would lead sites
that sell contraband to shift to a model in which their IP addresses are highly unstable, and
also suppose that it is not practical for payment intermediaries to filter their transactions in
a way that identifies the sites with unstable IP addresses. If that were so, then it might be
impractical for payment intermediaries to respond effectively to claims related to contraband.
It is this Article's impression-admittedly a contingent impression subject to change as
technology develops-that neither of those assumptions is correct.
124. See Mann, supra note 51, at 681.
125. That certainly would be true if the remedy extended to PayPal as well. This assumes
that barring an Internet retail site from accepting payments from Visa, MasterCard, and
PayPal would impose a substantial constraint on the site's revenues, largely because existing
payment alternatives remain unavailable to most consumers. For a discussion of some of the
problems with competing payment methods, see MANN & WINN, supra note 52, at 576-94.
126. One of the problem's most interesting aspects is the dynamic through which state
regulators secure voluntary agreements. They apparently operate in the shadow of potentially
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2. Internet Gambling
Internet gambling sites allow gamblers to play games or view
lines and place wagers on the outcome of everything from poker
games and football to the presidential election. 127 Not surprisingly,
traditional regulation of the primary malfeasors is difficult: Internet
gambling websites can be located anywhere in the world, outside the
reach of U.S. laws that attempt to regulate them.'28 As with sites
selling contraband and counterfeit products, the business model for
gambling websites is central to designing an effective regulatory
scheme. Because the sites depend on being readily identifiable
-pervasive advertising helps to give them offline brand identity-
the domain names and IP addresses they use are relatively stable
more onerous formal regulation. Without going into great detail, the willingness of PayPal to
cooperate with state regulators is undoubtedly attributable to its desire to avoid initiatives
that would bring its entire business under regulation as a money transmitter or the like. The
willingness of more traditional credit card providers to cooperate is not as easily understood,
given that they could bring strong arguments that the activities of state regulators cannot
extend to the activities of national banks that are permitted by federal regulators. Seemingly,
some likelihood of federal support is important in most situations of effective state
intervention. Notice, for example, the participation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives in the widely noted settlement regarding online tobacco sales. See
supra note 19. Similarly, as discussed in Part III.A.2, federal policymakers plainly have
provided consistent support to state regulatory initiatives aimed at offshore gambling. The
hypothesis is that here, as in the corporate governance area, the shadow of a potentially more
disruptive federal solution directly influences the resolution of disputes at the state level. Cf.
Roe, supra note 27 (discussing the parallel corporate governance dynamic).
127. One website, Tradesports.com, located in Dublin, Ireland, famously offered lines on
almost every political race of 2004, and incidently, correctly predicted the winner of every
state in the presidential race. See George Passantino, Putting Their Money Where the Votes
Are, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2004, at B3.
128. And this is apparently exactly what Internet gambling companies are doing to ensure
financial success. PartyGaming, an Internet gambling website that recently went public in
Great Britain, acknowledged in securities documents that the company could be engaging in
illegal conduct in some of the countries from which it draws customers. But the company
shrugged off the concern, stating, "PartyGaming and its directors rely on the apparent
unwillingness or inability of regulators generally to bring actions against businesses with no
physical presence in the country concerned." Kurt Eichenwald, At PartyGaming, Everything's
Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,2005, at B1. Apparently unconcerned with this spectre of illegality,
the market embraced PartyGaming stock, making it one of the largest IPOs in London in
recent history. Id. Interestingly, the size of the IPO and the subsequent success of the shares
indicates that American fund managers are among PartyGaming's investors. Heather
Timmons & Eric Pfanner, Online Gambling Shares Climb 11% in Debut Day, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2005, at C6. This fact may make it very difficult for prospective action against such
online gambling companies to gain any traction in the face of what would certainly be sizeable
opposition from U.S. interests.
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and unlikely to be shared with other sites.129 Importantly, a
gambling site's business model depends directly on making it easy
to transmit money to the site. 30 This Article's discussion starts with
a summary of the existing regulatory scheme for the purpose of
underscoring its ineffectiveness, and follows with an analysis of how
liability for intermediaries could enhance the effectiveness of
regulation.
Under U.S. law, the states are the primary regulators of gam-
bling.'3 ' This has allowed each state to take an approach to gam-
bling that is consistent with the particular state's mores. 3 2 This
approach allows states to eliminate a large portion of gambling
that actually occurs within the state, such as an illegal lottery being
run from within the state. States, however, have difficulty prevent-
ing activity that occurs outside their borders but that involves
citizens acting within their borders, such as the illegal solicitation
of customers in one state by a lottery being legally run in another
state. In these types of cases, the federal government has stepped
in to assist states in enforcing state gambling regulations.'33 But
generally, the federal government has refrained from exercising its
Commerce Clause power to broadly regulate gambling even though
the Constitution plainly would permit such regulation in the context
of Internet gambling.'34
129. For more on the frequency of shared IP addresses, see Benjamin Edelman, Web Sites
Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
edelmanlip-sharing (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
130. See Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 4419 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 64 (2000) (statement of Gregory A. Baer,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the Treasury); GAO REPORT,
supra note 49, at 53 (finding that more than eighty-five percent of Internet gambling websites
accept Visa and MasterCard as forms of payment).
131. See Chun v. New York, 807 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that authority
over gambling was reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment); Thomas v. Bible,
694 F. Supp. 750, 760 (D. Nev. 1988), affd, 896 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); State v.
Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977) (same).
132. For instance, the neighboring states of Nevada and Utah take opposite approaches to
gambling, presumably because of distinct cultural differences between those states' citizens.
133. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1302 (2003)) (making it illegal to send newspapers with lottery advertisements and
other lottery-related advertisements through the mail); Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat.
194, 196 (1868). See generally G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the
Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 923, 931 (1978) (discussing federal attempts
to control state lotteries).
134. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 852 (N.Y. Gen. Term
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Turning to the specific rules for Internet gambling, currently no
state permits Internet-based gambling.135 Assisting states with that
policy choice, the federal Wire Act, which was first enacted in 1961,
arguably outlaws Internet gambling,'36 and thus has been the
statute of choice in the few federal prosecutions of Internet gam-
1999) ("[Tlhe Interstate Commerce Clause gives Congress the plenary power to regulate
illegal gambling conducted between a location in the United States and a foreign location.");
see also GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
Although gambling regulation is generally left to the states, the federal
government has the authority, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
to regulate gambling activity that affects interstate commerce. Internet
gambling falls into this category, as bets are generally placed at a personal
computer in one state or country and received at a server in another state or
country.
Id. Even after United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Internet gambling transactions
would plainly involve interstate commerce even if the personal computer of the gambler and
the server were located in the same state, in part because Internet transmissions between
those locations would likely cross state lines and also because of the close relation between
those transactions and transactions that plainly cross state lines.
135. See H.R. REP. No. 108-133, at 5 (2003).
Virtually all States prohibit the operation of gambling businesses not expressly
permitted by their respective constitutions or special legislation. Internet
gambling currently constitutes illegal gambling activity in all 50 States.
Although in June of 2001 the Nevada legislature authorized the Nevada Gaming
Commission to legalize on-line, Internet gambling operations if and when such
operations can be conducted in compliance with Federal law, the Gaming
Commission believes that such compliance cannot be ensured at present.
Id.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). The Wire Act states:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result
of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.; see also Gottfried, supra note 32, 74-81 (discussing the application of the Wire Act to
Internet gambling). There is arguably some ambiguity in the text of the Wire Act that may
allow Internet gambling business to claim that their businesses are legal. But while the Fifth
Circuit has read the Wire Act to outlaw only Internet gambling involving "sporting events or
contests," In re Mastercard Intl, 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002), the Justice Department
has made it clear that it believes the Wire Act more broadly outlaws internet gambling. See
Statement of Kevin v. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary (June 24, 1998) ("Bets and wagers that would be prohibited
under Section 1084 [of the Wire Act] if placed by telephone, are still prohibited even if
transmitted via the Internet."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
kvd0698.htm. Many thanks to Orin Kerr for this point.
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bling. 3 7 But it does so by targeting those directly responsible for the
gambling, not the intermediaries who merely facilitate it. Thus,
under current law, intermediaries who do not knowingly13 partici-
pate in the gambling activity have no responsibility for it.' 39
a. Targeting ISPs
The first possibility is to use ISPs to limit Internet gambling. 4 °
As discussed above, the Internet gambling sites tend to be large,
stable, and visible operations. And although the source ISPs can be
located outside the reach of U.S. officials, destination ISPs"' must
have a presence inside the jurisdiction in which they offer services.
Thus, destination ISPs seem to be particularly well suited to assist
in limiting U.S. residents' access to gambling websites located
abroad. For example, if a destination ISP is aware of particular
gambling sites, it should be able to prevent their customers' traffic
from reaching those sites. Requiring ISPs to block such traffic would
tend to be limited to activity that is illegal in the jurisdiction of the
customer's ISP; this distinguishes gambling sites from sites like
eBay where the overwhelming majority of transactions are legal.'42
Thus, regulations that burden the site would inflict less collateral
damage on innocent users.'43
137. GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 11 ('CTo date, the Wire Act is the federal statute that
has been used to prosecute federal Internet gambling cases ....").
138. The Wire Act applies only to those who "knowingly" use a wire communication facility
to assist gambling. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
139. For a discussion of the similar problems other jurisdictions face, see Colin Scott,
Regulatory Innovation and the Online Consumer, 26 LAw & POLy 477, 481-82, 500 (2004).
140. See Jack L. Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet
Regulation, 32 IN'L LAW. 1115, 1119 (1998).
141. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
142. That analysis is open to the strategy that operators of gaming websites might open
a wide-ranging "Games Bazaar" involving both legal and illegal activity, the effect of which
would be to increase the collateral harm of regulation. The costs imposed by this kind of
tactical design, however, should not count as a reason against regulation. And, if the law
establishes that such "Bazaars" will be subject to restrictive regulation, then, from an ex ante
perspective, it would be quite bizarre for a rational businessperson to opt for a "Bazaar"
structure. For a thorough discussion of using law to alter the scope of bundled products, see
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in
Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 189 (2005).
143. Such regulation may nevertheless be costly. On November 24, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) ruled that U.S. laws, such as the Wire Act, violated U.S. commitments
to the WTO. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
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At that point, the question becomes one of selecting an appropri-
ate regulatory scheme. Intuitively, this is a case in which a less
onerous "hot-list" scheme makes the most sense. First, law enforce-
ment authorities are likely better placed than ISPs to identify illicit
gambling sites. Although it is unclear whether ISPs could easily
identify the sites as illicit based on the nature of the transmissions
going to and from the sites, law enforcement authorities could
identify illicit sites-at least the successful ones-for example, by
researching with search engines and observing advertisements.144
Also, because the crime of gambling is victimless in a sense, the
object of law enforcement authorities will likely be to limit the
availability of the sites going forward, rather than to ensure that a
payment is extracted for each unlawful transaction that has
occurred in the past. Thus, a "hot-list" scheme is likely to serve the
felt needs of law enforcement while minimizing the costs to ISPs
and consequently the costs to ISPs' innocent customers.
Nonetheless, significant difficulties exist with this approach,
starting with the difficulty of coordinating multistate regulation.
Assume, for example, that Nevada wishes to permit certain forms
of Internet gambling that Utah prohibits.14 If Utah required its
ISPs to block transmissions to and from the sites in question,
Nevada customers would likely be adversely affected. Indeed, this
type of problem would be inevitable if an ISP's customer base
transcended the state line, absent some technological ability to
differentiate among the ISP's customers based on their physical
location and to adjust the filter's effectiveness accordingly. Of
course, enactment of a single federal regulation would solve much
of the problem, largely because of the greater likelihood that all
customers of U.S. ISPs would reside in the United States.146 To be
sure, some reason exists to be wary of rapid federalization of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R at 2.1 (Nov. 10, 2004). A WTO appeals panel
later reversed that decision, but did not explicitly endorse federal regulation of Internet
gambling under the WTO. See supra note 50.
144. The intuition that law enforcement authorities easily could identify the sites if they
wished is based in part on the authors' personal observations of the frequency of radio
advertising for illegal Internet gambling sites on sports radio stations in some cities.
145. This example is given in Gottfried, supra note 32, 76.
146. The problem is a standard one of regulatory symmetry: in practice, national
boundaries tend to bound ISP markets, which often makes imposing regulations at the
national level easier. See Mann, supra note 51, at 706.
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Internet gambling, 147 as a subset of e-commerce, largely because it
denies regulators the opportunity to compare the effectiveness of
competing approaches. 148
Another problem is the possibility that such a regulation would
violate the First Amendment. As discussed in more detail in the
section on child pornography,'49 one federal district court recently
held that blocking technology used to implement the Pennsylvania
Internet Child Pornography Act violated the First Amendment
because the technology led to overblocking; that is, it blocked sites
that were not engaged in illegal conduct. 5 ° As discussed above,
gambling sites are much more readily identifiable than pornography
sites, and because of their large traffic, at least the successful ones
that are important targets are unlikely to share IP addresses."'
Thus, the overblocking problem is likely to be less serious in this
context." 2 Also of relevance is that the targeted activity-gambling
rather than pornography-is entirely commercial, and thus not as
likely to garner First Amendment protection. For those reasons,
some basis exists for thinking that the schemes this Article proposes
would satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Still, to the extent that the
147. The problem is complicated by the arguable hypocrisy of state gambling policy, which
to an external observer appears designed to provide monopoly power in the gambling market
to Native Americans and government entities rather than to limit gambling based on the
harms it causes consumers. This view is further supported by the increasing reliance of state
governments on gambling revenue, which surely gives them incentives to combat competition
from offshore gambling operations. See Fox Butterfield, As Gambling Grows, States Depend
on Their Cut to Bolster Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at A24. These inconsistencies in
U.S. policy are part of the reason efforts to target overseas gambling operators have been
challenged as inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO. United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 143, 3.7-
3.9; see also supra Part I.B.2.a.
148. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce,
51 EMORY L.J. 1, 67-70 (2002) (discussing inherent problems with federal regulation of
electronic commerce, such as public choice concerns, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the
prevention of state regulation that may turn out to be a more effective method for regulating
the new industry).
149. See infra Part III.A.3.
150. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610-11 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
151. Contra Gottfried, supra note 32, 75 (refraining from distinguishing Internet
gambling sites from other kinds of websites, eighty-seven percent of which share IP
addresses).
152. Contra id.
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constitutional question remains unclear, it should give regulators
some hesitation in pursuing this strategy.
153
A final concern is that gambling websites would react to ISP
blocking by designing their user interfaces to utilize other technolo-
gies not susceptible to IP blocking.' Any such evolution would
likely not place gambling activities outside the reach of ISPs, who
would nonetheless be required to carry the communication. Rather,
blocking techniques may have to adapt as technologies adapt. For
instance, if gambling websites distribute software that connects
gamblers directly to the gambling hall, instead of to a website as
most business models currently do, then blocking the TCP port the
program utilizes is one potential response. 155 The point here is not
to convince the reader that any imaginable technological adaptation
by gambling websites has a potential ISP blocking response. Rather,
the point is that possible evolution by gambling interests is not a
justification for refusing to enlist ISPs in regulating Internet
gambling, especially when foreseeable responses to gambling
evolution exist.
The skeptic who doubts Congress's willingness to step into an
area traditionally left to state regulation should consider that
Congress recently has entertained such legislation: the proposed
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 would have required
ISPs to terminate accounts for those running Internet gambling
sites and to block access to foreign Internet gambling websites
identified by law enforcement authorities. 156 This Article's analysis
153. Because of Congress's consistent support of state regulation in this area, this Article
does not discuss the possibility that state regulatory initiatives in this area would violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.
154. Indeed many gambling websites are beginning to adopt programs that allow gambling
without the use of traditional browsers. See, e.g., Starluck Casino, Getting Started,
http://www.starluckcasino.com/slcasino/englishlgettingstarted.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2005).
155. This is a response to the P2P problems suggested by Solum & Chung, supra note 39,
at 929-30.
156. H.R. REP. No. 106-655, at 20 (2000).
Finally, the bill would impose new mandates on Internet service providers
(ISPs). H.R. 3125 would require Internet service providers to terminate the
accounts of customers who run gambling businesses or promote illegal gambling
and to block specific foreign gambling Internet sites when given an official notice
of noncompliance by state or federal law enforcement agencies.
Id. For a sympathetic discussion of similar legislation, see Goldsmith, supra note 140, at 1117-
18.
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suggests that such statutes may indeed be an appropriate response
for policymakers who view gambling as imposing a serious social
harm. 157
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries
The use of payment intermediaries to curtail Internet gambling
has obvious advantages. As suggested above, the business model for
gambling sites depends on ready and convenient facilities for the
transmission of funds to the sites. Given the dependence of those
businesses on traditional payment intermediaries, law enforcement
authorities apparently could impose a considerable obstacle to the
business of those sites by curtailing activity from a small number
of intermediaries. Moreover, because this would not involve the
potential for overblocking, a First Amendment challenge does not
seem plausible. Finally, because a "hot-list" scheme barring trans-
missions to Internet gambling sites would closely resemble existing
"hot-list" schemes with which financial intermediaries already must
comply, 158 such a scheme would seem unlikely to impose costs on
Internet gambling sites sufficient enough to raise the prospect of
worrisome collateral effects on law-abiding customers.
This Article's sanguine view of the use of payment intermediaries
is influenced by the extent to which informal efforts directed at
payment intermediaries have been successful even without formal
legal support.'59 First, many card issuers voluntarily have limited
the use of their credit cards for gambling transactions. In the case
of Providian National Bank, the limitation on credit card use seems
to have been in response to lawsuits by individuals who refused to
pay debts incurred at Internet gambling sites based on the dubious
claim that the activity was illegal and that the card issuer so
facilitated the activity as to make the debt unenforceable.' Other
157. See supra note 147.
158. See, e.g., OFAC REPORT, supra note 100, at 5-43 (describing the regulations requiring
financial institutions to block transactions to individuals and countries).
159. See Gottfried, supra note 32, 86; Scott, supra note 139, at 490.
160. See Cross-cl., Providian Nat'l Bank v. Haines (Cal. Super. Ct. 1998) (No. V980858)
(making such a claim); see also Gottfried, supra note 32, 82-85; Courtney Macavinta, Net
Gambler Sues Credit Firms, CNET NEWS, July 24, 1998, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
213705.html?legacy=cnet&owv; Courtney Macavinta, Providian May Bar Customers from Net
Gambling, CNET NEWS, Oct. 22, 1999 (explaining the response by Providian to the Haines
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issuers seem to have acted out of broader concerns, including
concerns about the credit risk involved in gambling transactions.'
But whatever the reason, those actions apparently have negatively
affected the growth of Internet gambling enterprises.162
More famously, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has
been conspicuously successful in convincing payment intermediaries
that facilitating Internet gambling is not in their best interests. 63
Spitzer gained enormous leverage after winning a case in New York
that held New York law applicable to Internet gambling regardless
of the server's location or the company's registration.'64 Armed with
that decision as well as a federal circuit court decision holding that
federal law made Internet gambling illegal,'65 Spitzer began
negotiating with payment intermediaries to encourage them to limit
their involvement with Internet gambling. Presumably, Spitzer was
case), http://news.com.com/2100-1040-231845.html?legacy-cnet.
161. GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 4.
Full-service credit card companies that issue their own cards and license
merchants to accept cards have implemented policies prohibiting customers from
using their cards to pay for Internet gambling transactions and will not license
Internet gambling sites. Credit card associations have instituted a different
approach-a transaction coding system that enables association members, at
their discretion, to deny authorization of properly coded Internet gambling
transactions. Many major U.S. issuing banks that are members of these
associations have chosen to block such transactions because of concerns over
Internet gambling's unclear legal status and the high level of credit risk
associated with the industry.
Id.
162. Charles Crawford & Melody Wigdahl, Internet Payment Solutions, in THE INTERNET
GAMBLING REPORTV 88-89 (Mark Balestra ed., 5th ed., Trace Publ'ns 2002) (1997) (estimating
that Internet gambling sites that relied on U.S. gamblers saw their revenues decrease by
thirty-five to forty percent in 2000, likely as a result of credit card companies' efforts to stop
use of their cards for Internet gambling purposes). See GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 4.
[The credit card industry's efforts to restrict the use of credit cards for Internet
gambling could, according to research conducted by gaming analysts, reduce the
projected growth of the Internet gaming industry in 2003 from 43 to 20 percent,
reducing industrywide revenues from a projected $5.0 billion to approximately
$4.2 billion.
Id.
163. Less famously, the Florida Attorney General followed a similar strategy that was
successful in convincing Western Union to refrain from facilitating transactions with Internet
gambling operations. See Gottfried, supra note 32, 86.
164. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848-50, 858 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1999) (finding the corporation's personal contacts with New York sufficient to exert
personal jurisdiction and apply New York state law).
165. United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2001).
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able, at least implicitly, to threaten litigation against these payment
intermediaries as accomplices in the commission of the illegal
gambling activity.' Regardless of how the pressure was exerted, it
was successful. The largest commitment came when Citibank
agreed to not approve credit card transactions involving Internet
gambling websites. 6' A couple of months later, Spitzer entered into
an agreement with PayPal that required the company to deny any
transactions that it knew involved an Internet gambling website. 168
More recently, Spitzer has extended those agreements with
commitments from ten additional banks to similarly end approvals
for credit card transactions that involve Internet gambling.'69
Again, as with the activity of ISPs, Congress has considered but
not yet enacted legislation targeting payment intermediaries.
Specifically, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition
Act 1' ° would have forbidden payment systems from honoring
payments for gambling-related services.' 7 ' The very possibility of
such a statute casts a shadow over the negotiations among state
regulators and payment intermediaries, thereby making plausible
requests for cooperation difficult for the intermediaries to with-
stand. 17
2
166. Contra, e.g., In re MasterCard Intl Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 471,497 (E.D. La. 2001)
(holding that a cardmember's use of credit to fund gambling activities at brick-and-mortar
establishments does not mean that the credit card company is involved in gambling or the
promotion of gambling); Cie v. Comdata Network, 275 Ill. App. 3d 759, 760 (1995) (same),
appeal denied, 662 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 1996); Jubelirer v. MasterCard Intl Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d
1049, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (same). In the Internet context, however, whether the activity
is both illegal and easily identified as illegal is important.
167. Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (June
21, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ Internet/litigationcitibank.pdf.
168. Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of PayPal, Inc. (Aug. 16, 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/Internetlitigation/paypal.pdf.
169. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Ten Banks
End Online Gambling with Credit Cards (Feb. 11, 2003), http:/www.oag.state.ny.uspress/
2003/feb/feb 1 ib03.html.
170. See S. REP. NO. 108-173 (2003) (considering the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act, which targeted payment intermediaries); H.R. REP. NO. 108-145 (2003); H.R.
REP. No. 108-133 (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-51, pt. 1 (2003); H.R. REP. NO. 107-339, pt. 1
(2001); H.R. REP. No. 106-771, pt. 1 (2000).
171. See S. REP. No. 108-173, at 16 (2003) ("The bill also would require financial
institutions to take steps to identify and block gambling-related transactions that are
transmitted through their payment systems."). See also Gottfried, supra note 32, 1 87-90.
172. This Article's analysis is limited to the United States. Arthur Cockfield suggests that
there is at least the possibility that data protection rules like the EU's Data Protection
Directive might hinder the lawful cooperation of intermediaries in some countries.
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In sum, targeting ISPs to limit Internet gambling is not implausi-
ble, but regulation of payment intermediaries is likely to be more
effective, and less likely to involve collateral effects on lawful
transactions and to face complicating legal challenges.
3. Child Pornography
Although the First Amendment has limited the ability of the
U.S. legal system to condemn pornography broadly, child pornog-
raphy has long been condemned and made illegal both in the
United States 73 and around the world.'74 Specifically, the Sexual
Exploitation of Children Act of 1978175 makes the production or
distribution of obscene images of children illegal.
17
During the 1970s and 1980s, child pornography laws apparently
were relatively effective, at least in the United States, largely
because the distribution of pornography required printed material,
which was difficult to find and expensive to purchase if found. 177 But
173. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (stating that content which depicts
children engaged in sexual conduct is "a category of material outside the protection of the
First Amendment").
174. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 34, Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448, 1469 ("States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: ... (c) The exploitative
use of children in pornographic performances and materials."); PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND
TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 30 (2001) (describing efforts to crack down
on the sexual exploitation of children in London in the 1880s and Los Angeles in the 1930s).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (2000) (outlawing the use of the mail to distribute child
pornography or to produce child pornography for distribution through the mail).
176. The law was originally limited to those under age sixteen, but later raised to age
eighteen. See Child Protection Act of 1984, ch. 110, § 5, 98 Stat. 204, 205 (1984).
177. See Katherine S. Williams, Child-Pornography and Regulation of the Internet in the
United Kingdom: The Impact on Fundamental Rights and International Relations, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 463, 469 (2003) ("Prior to the Internet, this backseat for child pornography was
possibly justified; in the 1970s and 1980s magazines dealing in the area were difficult to
obtain, involving penetrating a complex black-market and were generally expensive. The
official clampdown had reduced the trade considerably."); File-Sharing Programs: Child
Pornography Is Readily Accessible over Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Linda D. Koontz, Director,
Information Management Issues) [hereinafter Koontz Testimony], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld03537t.pdf.
Historically, pornography, including child pornography, tended to be found
mainly in photographs, magazines, and videos. With the advent of the Internet,
however, both the volume and the nature of available child pornography have
changed significantly. The rapid expansion of the Internet and its technologies,
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with the Internet's advent, the distribution of child pornography has
become cheaper and less risky.17 Producers can be anywhere in the
world, beyond the reach of law enforcement. The result has been a
proliferation of child pornography over the Internet.'79
This proliferation began on websites, but more recently has
shifted primarily to peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, following the same
pattern as music piracy.' The shift to P2P networks needs to be
emphasized because it reveals a division of business models that
distinguishes this policy problem from the ones discussed above:
activity on peer-to-peer networks is more difficult to regulate
through intermediaries because it is more difficult for an ISP to
identify and because it often will not require the use of any payment
intermediary, as no payment may be required. To the extent that a
substantial shift to P2P networks occurs, it undermines the
effectiveness of any gatekeeper remedy and thus decreases the
relative desirability of such a remedy.
a. Targeting ISPs
Again, this Article starts with the possibility of targeting ISPs.
Because of the perception that any level of child pornography is a
sufficiently serious policy problem to justify substantial regulatory
regimes, lawmakers have already moved to enlist the aid of
intermediaries in limiting the spread of child pornography. The
most prominent legislation is Pennsylvania's Internet Child
Pornography Act of 2002.181 That law adopted a '"ot-list" regime,
under which ISPs are liable if they allow child pornography to be
accessed through their services after being notified that the
pornography is available at a particular site:
the increased availability of broadband Internet services, advances in digital
imaging technologies, and the availability of powerful digital graphic programs
have led to a proliferation of child pornography on the Internet.
Id. at 4.
178. See Williams, supra note 177, at 469.
179. In 2002, there were 26,759 reports of child pornography on websites, and 757 reports
of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks, a fourfold increase from the previous year).
Koontz Testimony, supra note 177, at 2-3.
180. Id. at 6.
181. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7622 (West 2004).
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An Internet service provider shall remove or disable access to
child pornography items residing on or accessible through its
service in a manner accessible to persons located within this
Commonwealth within five business days of when the Internet
service provider is notified by the Attorney General pursuant to
section 7628 (relating to notification procedure) that child
pornography items reside on or are accessible through its
service.I"2
Penalties for failing to comply with the requirement escalated
from a third degree misdemeanor fine of $5,000 for the first offense
to a third degree felony fine of $30,000 for the third or subsequent
occurrence.8 3 These penalties could be quite high if ISPs were
unable or unwilling to block access to these sites. But the "hot-list"
system, as opposed to a traditional damages regime, ensured that
the ISPs would at least have the opportunity to avoid the fine by
blocking access to a particular URL.
In practice, however, the ability of providers to block access was
not as easy as the legislature apparently supposed. The Pennsylva-
nia Attorney General enforced the law against what this Article
calls destination ISPs.' 4 When the ISPs received notice that child
pornography could be accessed over their networks, the ISPs
typically attempted to comply by filtering their traffic either for IP
addresses, DNS entries, or URLs."'8 In theory at least, any of those
approaches might be successful in censoring the targeted content,
but each network operates slightly different and was able to
implement some of the technologies more efficiently than others.'86
In practice, most ISPs used IP filtering because it was the simplest
for them to implement.8 7 The problem with IP filtering, however, is
that a website can keep the same URL and change IP addresses. 8 '
Because the URL is the information customers remember to find the
182. Id.
183. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7624 (West 2004).
184. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 620-21 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (explaining that the Attorney General subscribed to Internet service from AOL, Verizon,
WorldCom, Microsoft Network, Earthlink, and Comcast and surfed the web through these
services, sending notices to the ISPs as child pornography was accessed).
185. Id. at 628.
186. Id. at 629.
187. See id. at 629, 636-37 (describing specific examples of ISP compliance).
188. Id. at 632.
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site, monitoring is wholly ineffective if it permits the site to avoid
regulation simply by changing the IP address but not the URL. ISPs
could respond by routinely checking URLs and updating IP
addresses.189 At the time of the Pappert litigation, however, the most
cost-effective method of monitoring also appeared easy to evade.
Another problem is that IP blocking often leads to blocking
content which was not targeted, largely because of "virtual hosting,"
whereby one web server hosts several websites that share a single
IP address but have different URLs. 9 ° Because of the perception
that this so called "overblocking" resulted in blocking protected
speech, a district court in 2004 held the statute unconstitutionally
overbroad. 9' The court acknowledged that the law did not prescribe
a particular method of blocking prohibited content, but noted that
the methods reasonably available to the ISPs resulted in blocking
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.
19 2
Additionally, the court was clearly influenced by its perception that
authorities were implementing the statute with little concern for the
potential for unjustified blocking, both through incorrect blocking of
sites in the first instance and through failure to remove blocks from
sites after prohibited material had been removed. 9 ' Ultimately, the
court concluded that these problems left the law beyond the bounds
of regulation permitted by the First Amendment.9 4 Moreover, the
court even went so far as to hold that the statute violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.'95 The court generally reasoned that
because the statute could be easily evaded, its local benefits were so
trivial that the Commerce Clause would not tolerate the inevitable
189. Id.
190. Id. at 617-18, 633.
191. Id. at 658 ('The operation and effect of this Act is that speech will be suppressed when
a court order is issued, and the procedural protections provided by the Act before the order
can issue are insufficient to avoid constitutional infirmity."). The decision follows a line of
similar cases invalidating statutes which require ISPs not to provide harmful materials to
minors over the Internet. E.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2004);
ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969
F. Supp. 160, 161, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
192. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 637-42, 650-51.
193. Id. at 642-43. Zittrain, supra note 28, provides a thorough discussion of the
technological questions involved, detailing a number of steps that ISPs or regulators could
take to limit the costs of such regulation.
194. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
195. Id. at 661-63.
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burden on other jurisdictions when the blocking affected out-of-state
actors. 196
Pappert imposes an unfortunate roadblock on the use of interme-
diary liability in this area. To be sure, the dormant Commerce
Clause problem is probably not a serious one, both because the
decision on that ground seems implausible'97 and because congres-
sional legislation explicitly banning child pornography from the
Internet or authorizing states to do so should not be difficult to
obtain. The more imposing impediment is how to deal with the First
Amendment problem, which is not within Congress' control. A
regulator who diligently tried to prevent the blocking of valid speech
would perhaps obtain a better result. Still, at least for the time
being, a law that was so well targeted as to satisfy the Pappert court
would force ISPs to invest significant funds in redesigning their
networks to use URL blocking rather than IP blocking.'98 The law
also apparently would have to provide for notice to blocked URLs
and a mechanism for removing a block from URLs once prohibited
speech has been removed.'99 In sum, the costs to ISPs of compliance
with such a law are likely to be sufficiently substantial to under-
mine the net benefits of such a regime, even in the minds of
policymakers who view child pornography as a highly serious social
problem. Again, advances in blocking technology could change that
balance in short order. For now, however, even though some states
appeared to be unfazed by the Pappert decision,"0 the problems with
targeting ISPs seem substantial.
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries
A second option for curtailing child pornography is to target the
payment intermediaries who make it profitable for child pornogra-
196. Id.
197. For a thorough discussion of the relevant Commerce Clause concerns, see Jack L.
Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J.
785 (2001).
198. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
199. Id. at 642.
200. In March 2005, the Utah governor signed a bill very similar to the Pennsylvania
statute that was struck down in Pappert. Declan McCullagh, Utah Governor Signs Net-Porn
Bill, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 21, 2005, http://ecoustics-cnet.com.comfUtah+governor+signs+
Net-porn+billI2100-1028_3-5629067.html. The governor's spokesperson indicated that the
governor did not "have a concern about the constitutional challenge." Id.
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phy to be sold over the Internet. As discussed above, a significant
amount of pornography is distributed through noncommercial
transactions. 20 1 But commercial websites remain a major source of
child pornography on the Internet, providing much of the material
that is distributed through noncommercial transactions. °2 Thus,
although targeting payment intermediaries would not stop noncom-
mercial distribution of child pornography, it could significantly limit
the commercial source of much of the pornography and thus have a
substantial effect on the level of wrongful conduct.2"3 Indeed, the
effectiveness of targeting payment intermediaries might be greater
for child pornography sites than for gambling sites. This is true
because commercial pornography websites generally require credit
card information to be on file before any customer can access the
service. The point is that the credit card both ensures payment for
the service and verifies the customer's age to prevent problems that
the site would face if it too easily permitted minors to access
pornographic material." 4 Thus, access to credit card processing is
essential to the business of commercial pornography websites. °5
Following a "hot-list" strategy similar to the proposed Unlawful
Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act,2 °6 states could pass
laws that make it illegal to process credit card transactions from
websites offering child pornography. These laws could instruct
201. See Koontz Testimony, supra note 177, at 5 (listing Usenet groups and peer-to-peer
networks as principal channels of distribution of child pornography).
202. See id. at 5-6. This Article speculates that the noncommercial distribution of material
that is introduced to the Internet in proprietary transactions is caused at least in part by the
difficulty that the operators of commercial child pornography sites would face in enforcing
rights they might have under copyright law to prevent copying of the material.
203. A strategy targeted at limiting commercial exploitation of child pornography could
possibly lead to an increase in noncommercial P2P-based child pornography. It is plausible,
however, that regulators would view the eradication or mitigation of commercial exploitation
as an important policy achievement whatever the effect might be on P2P exploitation.
204. Pornography websites were channeled into the use of credit cards to verify age in part
by the affirmative defense offered by section 231 of the Communications Decency Act. 47
U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A) (2000) ("It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that
the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors ... by requiring use of a credit card, debit account ....").
205. See Koontz Testimony, supra note 177, at 5-6 (mentioning a child pornography ring
that included websites based in Russia and Indonesia, content malfeasors located out of U.S.
reach, and a Texas-based firm that provided credit card billing and access service for the
sites).
206. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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Attorneys General to monitor websites and update lists of those
websites for which credit card transactions should not be processed.
Although such a law almost certainly would be challenged on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, 2 7 any successful litigation
probably would result in nothing more than a shift of legislative
authority to the federal level: child pornography has so little public
support that one could easily predict that federal legislators would
be happy to pass, implement, and take credit for any statute that
would provide an effective remedy for child pornography. Thus,
state regulators might be able to obtain cooperation from payment
intermediaries even without formal federal intervention.
There is some possibility, which is difficult to assess, that
commercial websites could avoid regulation by routing their credit
card transactions through secondary companies that handle
transactions from many sites. The success of any such scheme
hinges on the merchant's ability to outsmart the efforts of interme-
diaries to suppress such transactions. Intuitively, the intermediar-
ies seemingly could defeat those efforts with relatively little
difficulty. First, for transactions to be submitted directly as the
transactions of another merchant is a direct violation of Visa and
MasterCard rules. Second, with respect to secondary processors,
which are permitted to submit transactions for other merchants,
Visa and MasterCard already engage in close monitoring that
makes it easy to identify transactions from particular illegal sites.2 °8
There remains the possibility of more sophisticated efforts at
evading scrutiny. For example, sites might try to change their IP
addresses and UIRLs so frequently as to make maintaining accurate
"hot-lists" difficult for law enforcement authorities.2 9 The existing
tools for monitoring the patterns of merchant transactions, however,
including the patterns of chargebacks, which are likely to be high at
207. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96 (describing the holding of the Pappert court
on dormant Commerce Clause grounds).
208. We know this from the pleadings in the Perfect 10 litigation. See supra note 78.
209. Although the authors have not engaged in field research to examine the question, the
anecdotal impression from news sources is that the pornography industry seems to differ in
this respect from the gambling industry because gambling sites depend largely on advertising
to draw customers, which requires stable domain names. Pornography sites, on the other
hand, depend largely on access from search engines and links from other sites, which seem
to be updated and changed frequently to avoid law enforcement monitoring.
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sites that provide adult content, would make any sincere210 effort at
implementation reasonably effective.
It also is relevant that the collateral costs of such an approach
would be relatively low. As discussed above, banks are already
required to monitor lists and ensure that payments are not made to
prohibited entities such as terrorists.211 Similar procedures for these
prohibited payment recipients could be easily plugged into existing
structures with little additional cost. Nor is there a great likelihood
of chilling valuable social conduct that is adjacent to or easily
confused with the targeted conduct: it might be that some adult
content that is technically not obscene would be chilled, but
regulators are likely to regard the social loss from that chilling as an
acceptable cost.
In the end, targeting payment intermediaries is unlikely to
completely prevent the dissemination of child pornography over the
Internet, but it could strike at the heart of the commercial industry
that profits from it. If a "hot-list" scheme like the one summarized
above in fact would impose a substantial financial barrier for those
firms, it seems likely that the regulation could be implemented
without substantial collateral harms to the intermediaries' law-
abiding customers. It remains to be seen whether the costs of such
a regime can be justified by the potential benefits of imposing those
imperfect barriers on the commercial sector of the child pornography
industry. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the reforms
outlined here should be attractive to policymakers who view
commercial child pornography as an important and serious problem.
4. Internet Piracy
One of the main driving forces behind this Article is the generally
myopic focus of the existing literature on copyright piracy as the
most salient example of wrongful Internet conduct. Accordingly,
because so much already has been written about regulatory schemes
210. As the staunch resistance in the Perfect 10 litigation suggests, sincerity of
implementation cannot be assumed too readily, given the great profits that the payment
intermediaries presently derive from sites providing adult content.
211. See, e.g., OFAC REPORT, supra note 100, at 5-43 (describing the regulations requiring
financial institutions to block transactions to individuals and countries).
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that respond to that problem, 212 this Article addresses the subject
only briefly, focusing on the key points of the analytical framework
set out above in Part 11.213
From that perspective, continuing the progression from the
sections above, the most salient feature of Internet piracy is the
extent to which it has become dominated by disaggregated P2P
filesharing. The technology of copyright infringement on the
Internet has evolved rapidly in the last decade. The basic point is
that preventing the posting of copyright-infringing material on
static websites through vicarious copyright infringement would be
easy, but peer-to-peer networks shield networks from copyright
infringement claims through the potential protection afforded by
Sony.2"4 Despite that potential shield, Napster was found guilty of
vicarious copyright infringement based on the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the network had the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity.215
Responding to that analysis, modern peer-to-peer networks have
eliminated even this element of their culpability by separating
networks from software and decentralizing the indexing process.1 6
They have thus shielded themselves from the type of vicarious
liability found in Napster."7 Moreover, following the lead suggested
by Kraakman's analysis of asset insufficiency,"' networks and ISPs
involved in the industry have evolved to become judgment proof,
212. Fashioning a regulatory scheme for copyright piracy also must account for the direct
effects of the Internet on the nature of the conduct. The Internet's main effect on gambling
and pornography has been to facilitate dissemination of activity that remains socially
unacceptable. With respect to copyrighted materials, however, the Internet's rise has altered
considerably the uses to which copyrighted materials are put, in ways that call into question
the continuing propriety of the existing framework and thus complicate vigorous enforcement
of that framework.
213. For a recent discussion that focuses directly on the propriety of intermediary liability,
see Hamdani, supra note 31.
214. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984) (setting forth the "substantial noninfringing uses" doctrine).
215. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163, 1165
(9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to find liability for Grokster even though it aided end users in
copyright infringement because the service was fundamentally different than Napster),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
217. Id.
218. See generally Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 82, at 868-69
(discussing asset insufficiency as a means to avoid corporate liability and the possible
protection afforded by managerial liability).
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thereby limiting the effectiveness of sanctions even against the
intermediaries. It seems natural to expect that as the technology
develops it will be so decentralized as to obviate the existence of any
intermediary gatekeeper that could be used to shut down the
networks.219
Indeed, despite the industry's victory in Napster and its more
recent, albeit limited, victory in Grokster,220 efforts to use intermedi-
aries to limit P2P filesharing have been so ineffective that the
content industry has turned again to what seems an almost
desperate attempt to prosecute individual copyright infringers who
make copyrighted material available over peer-to-peer networks.22'
At least initially, the content industry was able to prosecute such
claims because peer-to-peer networks and software allowed them to
capture enough information about individuals who connect to the
network to find the infringers and identify the extent of their
infringement.222 Without this information, copyright protectors
would not have enough information to file a claim. Capitalizing on
this, new networks and users have taken steps to avoid liability by
simply shielding their identities and libraries so that copyright
219. See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 685 (2003)
(explaining that peer-to-peer networks have eliminated the intermediary on which copyright
enforcement relies). The most interesting part of Wu's work is the general theme that the
cultural source of the great resistance to copyright law has been the tactical error to press
enforcement claims too harshly. This resonates with the backlash phenomenon described by
Mark Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998), and extended in POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
220. The industry's victory in Grokster does indeed seem to be quite limited as the Supreme
Court found the potential for liability not in the substantive copyright violations of the P2P
networks' customers, but for the way in which the companies distributed their products.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005). The
Supreme Court has thus said that future networks can provide identical services so long as
they do not actively encourage copyright violations. Id. at 2779-83.
221. See Amy Harmon, Subpoenas Sent to ile Sharers Prompt Anger and Remorse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2003, at C1. The success of these efforts is debatable. See Brian Hindo, Music
Pirates: Still on Board, Bus. WK., Jan. 26, 2004, at 13. In part, this is because the adverse
publicity those efforts have generated has suggested to most observers that Congress would
lack the political will to adopt a vigorous enforcement system that would result in strong or
sure punishment for individual filesharers. For an interesting Note on the dangerous, and
perhaps unconstitutional, effect of aggregating statutory damages in infringement cases such
as these, see J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal
File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004).
222. See Alice Kao, Note, RIAA v. Verizon" Applying the Subpoena Provision of the DMCA,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 408 (2004).
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protectors are unable to gather the necessary information to
prosecute their claims.22 And as this evolution of copyright
infringement continues, it seems most unlikely that prosecuting
individual users will result in an end to the harm.224
In the terms of this Article, the most plausible intermediary
strategy225 is regulation of the ISPs that provide service to the
individual user. If these ISPs have notice of copyright infringement
by subscribers, which copyright protectors are happy to give, they
could be required to terminate the customer's service. Because such
a scheme does not require monitoring by the ISPs but rather relies
wholly on monitoring by content providers, it could be implemented
with less cost than schemes that would require the ISP to monitor
its customers' conduct to identify unlawful filesharing, which strikes
us as quite difficult under existing technology and perhaps norma-
tively undesirable in any case.
Interestingly enough, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
already comes close to including such a regime in section
512(a)(6)(i)(1)(A), which withholds the DMCA liability shield from
any ISP that does not have a policy of terminating access for
customers who are "repeat infringers. '226 Why content providers
have not relied more heavily on that regime in their efforts to target
frequent P2P filesharers is unclear. The best guess is that the
provision is rendered ineffective by the ease with which any
individual terminated under that section could obtain Internet
access with a new provider.227
223. Scott Banerjee, P2P Users Get More Elusive, BILLBOARD, July 31, 2004, at 5.
224. Perversely, what probably has reduced the frequency of copyright infringement is
more crime: using P2P systems subjects a computer to the threat of viruses that are spread
inside the obtained files. Wendy M. Grossman, Speed Traps, INQUIRER (U.K.), Jan. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=20718. Another dissuasion has been the
recording industry's systematic effort to saturate P2P systems with dummy files that make
getting the music a user actually wants quite difficult. See Malaika Costello-Dougherty, Tech
Wars: P-to-P Friends, Foes Struggle, PC WORLD, Mar. 13, 2003, available at http://www.
pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,109816,00.asp (documenting the practice and attributing it to
a company called Overpeer, which is apparently an industry anti-piracy company).
225. There are of course other strategies. E.g., supra note 57.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(6)(i)(1)(A) (2000).
227. Notably, the provision is quite vaguely written and thus would be likely to result in
substantial litigation if it ever came into frequent use. Among the most obvious problems is
that it offers no guidance as to the meaning of the term "repeat" infringer or as to who is to
determine if particular customers "are" in fact repeat infringers. For a discussion of that
problem, see Lemley & Reese, supra note 57, at 1420-21.
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B. Breaches of Security
This Article closes with a brief discussion of a set of Internet
problems that collectively can be characterized as security harms:
viruses, spain, phishing, and hacking. Generally, these harms are
unique to the Internet because they involve conduct that is moti-
vated by the rise of the heavily interconnected networks that
comprise the Internet. The harm of these actions is measured by the
immense amounts of money spent by end users to purchase software
to avoid these problems, the harm to consumers whose personal
data is stolen,22 the time spent repairing damaged computers, and
the lost value of computers slowed or rendered inoperable by these
incidents.229 Because of the rapid technological development in this
area, the comparatively nascent regimes for defining the responsi-
bility even of primary malfeasors, and in part because of the
authors' relative lack of knowledge in the area, the authors are less
confident in their ability to discern the relevant policy concerns in
these areas than for the content harms discussed above. This Article
discusses the topic generally only to illustrate two obvious points
that this Article's framework suggests for these issues.
1. Lack of Strong Intermediaries
In comparison to the dissemination of illegal content that was the
subject of the preceding sections, this is not an area where a need
for legislative intervention to sanction intermediaries is nearly so
obvious. As the above examples illustrate, the paradigmatic case for
the deployment of a strategy of intermediary liability is the case in
which primary malfeasors cannot be controlled directly and in which
228. Of course, some data theft does not involve the Internet. However, the Internet
certainly exacerbates the data security problems our society confronts.
229. One estimate put the total cost of viruses at $55 billion for 2003. See Compressed
Data, supra note 15. Significant evidence exists to suggest that these problems are increasing.
According to a recent study, for example, the total number of phishing scams in December
2004 was 9,019, an 8,000% increase over the 107 such scams in December 2003. Brian Krebs,
Tech Heavyweights Agree to Share 'Phishing' Data, WASHINGTONPOST.CoM, Feb. 14, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24065-2005Feb14.html. See also Internet
'Phishing' Scams Soared in April, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, at B5 (reporting that phishing
scams more than doubled between March and April 2004).
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readily identifiable intermediaries exist that can readily control the
conduct yet choose not to do so. In some cases, direct regulation
seems both inevitable and potentially effective. For example, the
rash of recent data make it likely that Congress will enact legisla-
tion that regulates the activities of those that handle data. In
contexts in which that kind of regulation can be made effective23 °
-and the large size of many of the major data warehouses makes
that seem a plausible solution to the problem of data security-then
there is considerably less need to rely on intermediaries.
The context of security harms differs in two obvious respects from
that paradigm. First, whether any intermediary can readily control
the conduct in question is not clear. Perhaps the actors who are best
able to increase Internet security are the software manufacturers
that develop the applications that make the Internet useful.
Although it is possible to view the software designer as yet another
intermediary that could solve harms from viruses, spam, and
hacking, it is less useful to think of that as intermediary liability
than as a rapidly'developing species of products liability.2 31
Looking solely at the intermediaries identified in Part I.B.2 of
this Article, it seems unlikely that ISPs serving those who introduce
viruses and spain into the Internet community can control the
misconduct because of the difficulty of identifying the transmissions
that cause the problem and of filtering out the malicious code.232
230. Businesses that handle data have exposure to third parties under civil liability
regimes. In addition, the FTC and some states have been active in pursuing businesses that
inaccurately portray their privacy policies. See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, Credit Report Firm
Settles FTC Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at D1 (discussing a settlement over charges
that the company deceived customers seeking free credit reports). Yet the magnitude of recent
security breaches suggests that those solutions are likely to be insufficient. See, e.g., Eric
Dash & Tom Zeller, Jr., Mastercard Says 40 Million Files Are Put at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2005, at Al.
231. For a fine note outlining the perverse market incentives that have led to a market
failure for secure software, see Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 279 (2004).
232. This is not to say that ISPs should not be required to assist law enforcement officials
to the extent possible to track those who release malicious code onto the Internet. See
generally LICHTMAN & POSNER, supra note 30, at 5 (arguing for liability that forces such
cooperation). But this Article's relatively uninformed view is that it is technologically difficult
or impossible for ISPs to filter traffic to prevent the code from being released on the Internet
in the first place. In contrast, the responses this Article suggests to combat the harms
discussed in this Part involve intermediaries who have the ability to prevent harm in the first
instance. For a discussion of the rapidly evolving technological possibilities, see Zittrain,
supra note 28, at 91-105.
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Similarly, whether ISPs serving the customers victimized by
security breaches can solve the problem is unclear, again because of
the difficulty they face in designing reliable systems for identifying
harmful traffic. Finally, while phishing scams require the use of
ISPs to host spoofed content, those ISPs are source ISPs that can be
located anywhere in the world. Whether such spoofed websites are
hosted on computers located outside U.S. jurisdictions is an
empirical question to which the authors do not know the answer.
But even if it turns out that those ISPs are located within the
United States, targeting them will simply force those behind
phishing scams to move their operations abroad. 233 This does not
mean that devising effective intermediary-based strategies is
impossible. It is, however, likely to require a remedy that is
categorically more disruptive of the Internet's physical and social
character than the remedies discussed above.234
2. Market Incentives Already Exist
At the same time, market incentives appear to be driving
intermediaries to limit these kinds of harms. This is clearest with
respect to spam, where one of the most prominent service features
on which ISPs compete is their ability to protect customers from
spam.235 The basic point is that security harms generally have the
effect of directly harming the customers of those ISPs. Thus,
customers generally will value features of ISP service that limit
spam. To give another example, phishing threatens the legitimacy
of Internet commerce. If customers lose faith in the security of
Internet transactions, either because they are unsure about the true
identity of the websites they are visiting, or because they are not
confident in their own abilities to engage in e-commerce without
233. Websites that host some phishing content would likely be liable under a theory of
vicarious liability for fraud. Thus, state laws, and perhaps the Wire Act, already target the
primary malfeasors of the harm. But this obviously has not solved the problem.
234. Zittrain, supra note 28, at 105-13 (emphasizing the potential for highly intrusive yet
effective actions in this area).
235. Compare, e.g., Yahoo Mail's touting of its spain filters, Yahoo! Mail ("Powerful spain
protection: Read only the mail you really want"), http://mail.yahoo.comi..intl--us (last visited
Apr. 8, 2005), with Earthlink's spamBlocker software, provided free of charge to Earthlink
customers, Earthlink ("Powerful Junk Email Protection! We can help. Our spamBlocker tool
eliminates virtually 100% of junk email."), http://www.earthlink.net/software/free/
spamblocker/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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inadvertently divulging sensitive information, those customers are
likely to stop using e-commerce websites. This threat has lead to a
concerted effort by industry to combat phishing schemes.236 Further,
phishing scams have provided motivation for new technologies and
new firms to spring up to combat the danger.2 37 This of course is
quite different from the contexts discussed above: the customer
purchasing child pornography or gambling online would not wish to
pay a premium for an ISP service that made it practically impossi-
ble for the customer to gain access to sites containing that content.
In the context of data security, we also see promising responses
from intermediaries. For example, the credit card networks have
moved promptly to terminate their relationships with CardSystems
Solutions after CardSystems was the victim of a large data theft,
relying in part on the failure of CardSystems to comply with
network standards for data protection.23 To be sure, we do not know
that the networks would have acted without the public outcry that
accompanied this incident.2 39 Nevertheless, the rapid response does
underscore the distinction between data security and gambling.
Visa, MasterCard, and American Express gain nothing from
insecure data protection by their members and related processors.
This is quite different from the gambling context, where the
networks have the profits from the underlying transactions to offset
against the costs of allowing the merchants to remain in the
network.
This point should not be pushed too far. Doug Lichtman and Eric
Posner, for example, have argued with some force that the market
forces discussed here are suboptimal, so that the efforts this Article
identifies remain insufficiently vigorous.24 ° To the extent those
responses are suboptimal, the case for intermediary liability is
236. See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 229 (noting that Microsoft, eBay, and Visa recently signed
agreements to work with a firm that gathers information on phishing incidents).
237. See id.; Cloudmark Helps PayPal Deliver "No-Phishing" Solution to its Customers,
TMCnet.com, Dec. 16, 2004, (describing a plug-in available for Microsoft Outlook that helps
customers identify phishing emails), http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2004/Dec/1102325. htm.
238. See, e.g., Todd R. Weiss, Visa, Amex Cut Ties With CardSystems Due to Breach,
COMPUTERWORLD, July 25, 2005, at 10.
239. See Jonathan Krim, Credit Data Firm Might Close: After Databases Hacked,
Customers Cancel Contracts, WASH. POST, July 22, 2005, at D2 (discussing congressional
hearings on proposed data protection legislation after CardSystems data breach).
240. See LICHTMAN & POSNER, supra note 30, at 26-27.
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stronger, as they recognize.24' This Article's point here. is only that
the markets give some positive motivation in this area, which differs
from the gambling and pornography areas, where intermediaries
often profit from the misconduct. ISPs' efforts to date certainly have
not put them in a position to prevent this misconduct entirely, but
they do reflect at a minimum an effort to eradicate the conduct,
which differs substantially from the response the typical ISP takes
to respond to the possibility that its customers might be purchasing
child pornography or gambling online. If market incentives are truly
driving an appropriately vigorous response, then an overlay of
regulation would provide little added benefit, and might even be
counterproductive given the complexities of defining effective
remedies that are not highly intrusive.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is coming of age. Though at the Internet's advent it
may have been necessary to develop laws and policies that protected
the fertile ground in which the businesses and technologies of the
Internet have grown, today the Internet has taken hold and
permeates our daily lives. Virtually every U.S. company of any
significant size, even those whose core business is entirely unrelated
to the Internet, has incorporated the Internet into its business
model to increase efficiency and customer service. At the same time,
however, harm perpetrated over the Internet continues to grow each
year. The pirates have arrived on the high seas of the online world
and the lack of regulation makes their predations all too easy. The
time has come for lawmakers to implement sensible policies
designed to reign in the pirates while minimizing the impact on law-
abiding Internet users.
As the Internet enters the final stage in its development, this
Article suggests that lawmakers carefully reconsider the early policy
of Congress that Internet intermediaries should not bear any
burden in bringing order to the Internet. This policy ignores an
essential truth of the online world, namely that anonymity and
porous international borders make targeting primary malfeasors
difficult, if not impossible. Internet intermediaries, on the other
241. See id.
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hand, are easy to identify and have permanent commercial roots
inside the jurisdictions that seek to regulate the Internet. Further,
these Internet intermediaries are essential to most of the transac-
tions on which the Internet pirates rely. When intermediaries have
the technological capability to prevent harmful transactions and
when the costs of doing so are reasonable in relation to the harm
prevented, they should be encouraged to do so, with the threat of
formal legal sanction if necessary.
The Internet is indeed at a crossroads in its development.
Whether pirates will continue to threaten legitimate users of the
Internet or instead whether the Internet will fulfill its potential for
helping users live more fulfilling lives depends on the direction
lawmakers take in facing the challenges that currently befall the
Internet. Existing businesses that derive large profits from the
misconduct, for example, payment intermediaries with respect to
child pornography, may resist reforms vigorously. Conversely,
market forces or informal pressure applied from state regulatory
officials may solve many problems without the need for specific
legislative intervention. Alternatively, continuing market pressures
may force improved standards of operation that will solve many of
the problems this Article addresses. This Article has no firm
conviction about the shape of the final outcome but is offered in the
hope that it can aid the design of sensible Internet regulation.
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